3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 on well together, and it was generally believed that Brătianu had
665 forced the king to exclude Carol.

● [661] Communal elections were held in February in an atmosphere of political excitement. The government, for all its electioneering techniques, did badly, especially in the larger towns. It won only one-third of the seats in the Bucarest municipal council. In Bessarabia the United Opposition won all lists. The government was defeated in most Transylvanian towns, notwithstanding its pact with the Magyar party; it won most of the rural Transylvanian communes through official pressure and the aid of the gendarmerie.

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666 In March the Brătianu cabinet reached the end of its four-year term. In the last session of parliament it passed a new electoral law, whose unusual provisions were to make Rumanian elections even less representative of public opinion. Deputies had previously been elected on a proportional basis. According to the new act, modeled on Mussolini's law of January 7, 1923, the party gaining a plurality and at least 40 per cent of the votes was declared the majority party: it was to receive, as a premium, half the seats in the chamber plus a number of the remaining seats corresponding to its percentage of the total vote. Thus, a party gaining 40 per cent of the votes would occupy 70 per cent of the seats in the chamber (50 per cent plus two-fifths of the remaining 50 per cent). The remainder of the seats was divided proportionally among the other parties; a party failing to gain 2 per cent of the total votes obtained no representation.

According to the Liberals, there was nothing extraordinary about this law. A bill for electoral reform had been part of the Liberal program and had been stipulated in the 1923 Constitution.[19] In a country with such a multitude of unstable parties it might be argued that the "premium," as it was called, was a necessary device to give the party in office a sufficiently strong parliamentary majority to enable it to carry on its business.

Nevertheless, given the idiosyncrasies of Rumanian politics, the law had two very unfortunate effects. Since it was the practice for the crown to summon a government, which then proceeded to hold, or "make," elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus, the electoral law increased the opportunity for the selected group to swing the elections in its favor. On the other hand, the failure of a party obtaining less than 2 per cent of the votes to gain any repre-

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[19] According to Article 138 of the constitution, the current national assembly (i.e., the Liberal majority) could function after the promulgation of the constitution until the expiration of its mandate. During that period an electoral law was to be passed in accordance with the principles laid down in the constitution.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

sentation was a natural incentive for such parties to abandon the 175
parliamentary track altogether. The timing of the law led the op- 671
position parties to charge that it was merely part of the Liberals' 666
plan of grooming General Averescu to replace them, since his party was obviously weak in popular support. There is no question that in 1924 and 1925 Averescu had not cooperated with the other opposition parties but had worked in some measure with the Liberals.

On March 27, 1926, Brătianu resigned amid rumors that he fa- 665
vored General Averescu as his successor. The opposition was still 175
fumbling in its efforts to unite; negotiations between the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasant party had broken down again on March 22 over a disagreement on the distribution of cabinet posts. The king, on March 29, consulted the leaders of the Transylvanian National, Peasant, and People's parties and requested a coalition cabinet; apparently the Peasants and the Nationalists agreed. But on the following day, much to their chagrin, King Ferdinand called on General Averescu to form a government.

The reasons for the king's action are not altogether clear. The Nationalists and the Peasants had blundered in not mending their differences earlier and achieving a solid coalition. On the other hand, the king had been responsible for their dismissal in 1920 and was probably quite doubtful of their ability to govern properly and likely to accept the advice of Brătianu. Brătianu of course denied that his party had any agreement with General Averescu but his disclaimer is not convincing. "All we did," he said, "was to prepare the atmosphere in order to bring into power a government which would present a guarantee for the continuity of the work accomplished by us. Apart from this we are the declared opponents of the present government."[20] It was generally believed, and probably correctly, that Brătianu had strongly urged the king to install General Averescu.

Averescu held elections in May. The National party and the Peas- 661
ants, still unable to achieve fusion, agreed to collaborate in the elec- 666
tion. Despite the premium Averescu faced quite a task in overcoming his party's numerical weakness, but he acted resolutely and altogether successfully in one of the more outrageous Rumanian elections. Military officers on active service were appointed as prefects of a number of districts. Circulation of vehicles and persons was strictly controlled. The leaders of the opposition were unable to get in touch with their constituents; even Ion Brătianu was blocked on one trip, and Mihalache was arrested by gendarmes in his own electoral district. Gendarmes supervised public gatherings and were directed to intervene

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[20] *Times* (London), April 21, 1926.

661 if anyone attempted "to excite the people." Political manifestoes and
666 slogans required the approval of the prefect. On the day of the election, numerous opposition delegates were arrested and not permitted to supervise the voting or the counting. There was some violence and a few deaths.[21] Averescu, by these means, obtained 52 per cent of the votes, but under the premium he gained 292 out of 387 seats in the chamber, the Opposition block held 69 seats, the Liberals 16, Cuza's League of Christian Defense (an anti-Semitic formation) 10; the socialists and the Communist-sponsored workers' bloc, having obtained less than 2 per cent of the votes, were not represented.

665 After the election the National and Peasant parties continued their
175 efforts to unite. In September delegates of the two parties voted for fusion into a National Peasant party with Maniu as president and Mihalache as vice-president. Iorga, however, declined to vote, and the Peasant leader Dr. Lupu opposed the decision. The fusion was confirmed by the general congress held on October 10.

A new crisis arose with the serious illness of King Ferdinand in November, 1926, and the renewed controversies over the succession, Carol's renunciation, and the regency. The National Peasants, who believed that King Ferdinand had been an instrument of the Liberals, were dissatisfied with the succession and were reluctant to regard Carol's renunciation as final. All parties, however, felt that in the king's failing condition the Averescu cabinet was not sufficiently representative to govern alone. Brătianu sounded opposition leaders on the possibilities of forming a national cabinet. General Averescu made several unsuccessful efforts to achieve a coalition with the National Peasants, perhaps in an effort to free himself from his dependence upon the Liberals. Having failed to create a coalition he was obliged to resign on June 3, 1927.

A new "impartial" cabinet under Prince Barbu Ştirbey (a relative by marriage of the Brătianus and periodically proposed as the head of a caretaker cabinet, the last time in 1945) came to office and included some Liberals and Dr. Lupu, who had split with the National Peasants in February and formed an independent peasant group. After negotiations with the National Peasants, three members of Maniu's party joined the coalition. The principal object of this cabinet, which was in effect a temporary Liberal-National-Peasant coalition, was to preside over new and free elections. However, negotiations between Maniu and Brătianu broke down. Maniu refused Brătianu's proposal for a common list of candidates in the coming election with

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[21] The electoral abuses were brought up by opposition leaders in parliamentary interpellations after the elections.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

665 internal finances in order. In March the 1924 mining law was revised to give more favorable treatment to foreign concessions. State ex- 652 penditures were reduced through the elimination or consolidation of several ministries.[4]

665 For all their energetic beginning, before the National Peasants had been in power a year, the first flush of enthusiasm was beginning to fade. The badly defeated opposition undertook to rally its forces and started a press campaign of villification and sensational rumors. After the passage in July of the administrative reform bill, which attempted to reduce excessive centralization and place greater authority in the hands of local administrations, both the Liberals and General Averescu's party withdrew from the assembly. In the same month was uncovered an absurd fascist plot among army officers to overthrow the government. To defend the regime against these fascist currents, some of the party's younger followers set up their own paramilitary bodies.

665 At the same time that the Right was increasing its activities, the government came into conflict with the Left. Bessarabia was still a ●661 trouble zone; there were frequent reports of Soviet espionage teams crossing the Dniester. In February, 1929, A. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, son of the old Social Democratic leader and himself a former leader of the Rumanian Communists, was arrested and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for secretly returning to Rumania from the U.S.S.R. In August a strike broke out among 3,800 coal miners in the Jiu Valley. Troops were called and when the strikers attempted to take over the electric plant of the Lupeni mines the troops fired, killing over a score of miners. The massacre in the Jiu Valley has often been cited as an example of the perfidy of the National Peasants, but it should be said that when the government investigated the event, it not only blamed the miners for having violated the law but also censored the mining companies for permitting the conditions which had led to the strike. It dismissed all the police and military officials connected with the affair.

A couple of months later an attempt was made on Vaida Voevod's life. In the investigation which followed, one suspect, who was later proved to have been innocent, was horribly beaten and crippled by the police. Again there was a public scandal and the government

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[4] The bewildering changes in the names and numbers of Rumanian ministries seem to be largely a result of the need to provide portfolios for persons or groups who have supported the administration. The Ministry of Fine Arts has been the favorite post to be granted as a political reward.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

was charged with bad faith. The National Peasants reprimanded the 665
offending officials and maintained that such police brutality was an 661
evil inheritance which they were attempting to eradicate. Such incidents are of importance here only in showing the tenacity with which old habits persisted under the new order.

The failure of the economy to rally provided the really vulnerable 665
point for opposition attacks. The stabilization of the currency had 175
given rise to overly sanguine hopes that money would become plentiful—the Bucarest Jockey Club on the strength of it had doubled its
bridge points—but much of the funds went to paying old debts. Crops [433]
had been bad in 1927 and 1928, and one of the first tasks of the Maniu government had been to send relief supplies to Bessarabia. The 1929 harvest was excellent, one of the best in the interwar years, but exports were not great, and world grain prices were already beginning the long descent which was to continue until 1934.

The death in October, 1929, of one of the regents, Buzdugan, produced a typical Rumanian crisis. The Liberals contended that the two other regents should select the third member. The National Peasant assembly, however, elected the new regent, Constantin Sarațeanu, thus laying the party open to the same criticism that it had made of the Liberals in the creation of the regency in the first place. Moreover, Maniu seems to have failed to inform some of the Peasant members of the person to be selected and rumors spread, assisted by wishful opposition thinking, that the Transylvanians were forming an inner cabinet in the government. The principal result of the regency affair, however, was to arouse general dissatisfaction over such an arrangement and to increase talk of Carol's return.

In 1930 the situation was even less favorable. Economic improvement failed to round the corner. The opposition press increased its polemics by publishing wild reports of Soviet mobilization on the frontier, Communist uprisings in Bessarabia, and the government's secret intention to devalue the leu. This technique, long familiar in Rumania, was designed to rattle the government into making a false step, and did succeed in driving it to pass a law establishing a prison sentence for persons found guilty of spreading tendentious rumors likely to damage the credit of the state. Under this law the government confiscated several newspapers.

The municipal elections of March, 1930, showed an increase in Liberal strength, as the National Peasants led only by two to one. In May by-elections government candidates were returned in five constituencies, but were defeated in Cernăuți by a Ukrainian Nationalist change, in Rumania as elsewhere, from a paralyzed economic liberalism to increasing controls in commercial, financial, and industrial activity. 178

King Carol's own role in all these developments is rather elusive. 661● In the intricate game of political maneuvering his shrewdness is seen in the fact that starting from a weak position he not only established himself but drove all other political groups into the wilderness or prison. But for all his adept political manipulations and his flamboyant propaganda there is something unsubstantial about his reign, and nothing seems less real than his dictatorship. While he was not, as king, the frothy playboy the international press had depicted, he did not, either in his ideas or actions, show himself to be a statesman of any magnitude. He had a strong bent for personal rule, to which he attached some rather inconsequential corporatist clichés and an exaltation of the "younger generation." He seems to have had no coherent set of economic ideas beyond a romantic notion of himself as the first peasant, the first laborer, and the first public servant of his realm. The real economic direction came not from Carol but from the increasingly powerful industrialists who came to the fore in the years after the depression.

Survey of Political Events

Between Maniu's resignation in October and the accession of the 175 Liberals in November, 1933, Rumanian political and economic life was more than usually bewildering and confused. The depression was undoubtedly largely responsible for the feeling of panic and uncertainty apparent in the governments of these years. At the same time, the political events were not wholly a reflex of the immediate economic influence but had a certain logic of their own. Rumania's quasi-parliamentary party system was beginning to crumble, extraparliamentary groups were moving into the foreground, and Carol made his first if not successful effort to reorganize political life according to his own lights. These developments proceeded from sources deeper than the depression, though they were intensified by it; they were a part of that profound social crisis which has stricken most of the world in the last thirty years.

The National Peasant cabinet, reconstituted under Mironescu after Maniu's resignation, had a brief and unhappy career. Mironescu was an altogether colorless figure; the government during his term in office was halting and hesitant in its actions, and showed none of the enthusiasm of 1929. Carol was known to feel that the old parties—

175 648 tle Entente remained, the Balkan Entente was formed, and people were heard to say that the Balkans were beginning to mature. It was only a lull before the storm but it was perceptible.

175 661 The political history of these years is relatively uneventful. In the elections of December 20, 1933, the Liberals obtained a handsome majority in the chamber. After Duca's assassination and the creation of a cabinet under Tătărescu, a period of comparative quiet ensued. That this period was not one of tranquillity is shown by the repeated prolongations of the state of martial law, which had been applied after Duca's death and remained in force throughout the Tătărescu administration. In reality an intense tug-of-war was going on between the king and Tătărescu on the one hand and the Iron Guard on the other. It was less a conflict than a competition to gain a monopoly on the increasingly nationalist and extremist atmosphere which was pervading Rumania.

The relations between the Carol regime and the Iron Guard were equivocal, to say the least. Duca, leader of the Liberals, was assassinated by the Iron Guard, and yet the efforts of his successor to control the movement were certainly not convincing.[3] The Guard was officially dissolved but it quickly reappeared in a new guise as the All for the Fatherland party and continued to flourish. Even one of the Liberal members of the cabinet, Iamandi, ascribed the growth of the Iron Guard to the fact that since 1929 successive governments, including the Liberals, had tolerated or halfheartedly encouraged it in the hopes that they could deflect it from its more violent aims and find in it allies for combating communism.

Tătărescu said in 1936 that there was an abyss between the Liberals and the extreme Right, both in methods and concepts, but added, rather obscurely, that only a policy of conciliation was possible in a country where one-third of the population was minorities.[4] He held that the Liberals were tolerant of all parties, if they obeyed the law, but could not permit movements favoring either a red or a white dictatorship. There was all the difference in the world, however, between the earnest and efficient manner in which the government pursued the Communist party,[5] and the obvious indulgence

[3] In the trial of the assassins, for example, it was well known that the Guardist leader, Codreanu, was closely implicated in the murder but he was acquitted.

[4] *Times* (London), April 24, 1936.

[5] It was in 1936 that Ana Pauker, now Rumanian Foreign Minister, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, along with 18 associates, on the charge of propagating communism. She gained a good deal of publicity at this time because of public criticism of her treatment in prison and because of a newspaper dispute between *Dimineaţa* and *Universul* over her trial.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

with which the Iron Guard and the other fascist formations were treated. 175 661

By the 1930's the Iron Guard had become the manifestation of a quite powerful current in Rumanian life, a current arising out of the strains and dislocations in the society and intensified by the depression. The government, instead of opposing the current, tried to become master of it, and during these years it took on many of the attitudes and paraphernalia of the extreme Right. Early in its term in office the cabinet pressed for powers to issue decree-laws during parliamentary recess, ostensibly to improve efficiency. In the same year, 1934, the government announced that supervision of telephone calls—wire tapping—was to be extended from international to local and interurban calls. Compulsory labor brigades were introduced in 1936. Carol, for his part, was more and more the flamboyant father of his people. To counter the Iron Guard youth formations he created in 1934 his own youth movement, *Straja Ţării*. Carol's own 575 activities may in part be ascribed to his willful and arbitrary character, his belief that the king should be more than a passive symbol, and his dislike and distrust of the Rumanian party system,[6] but the atmosphere of the time unquestionably nurtured these inclinations.

In 1936 the temporary calm showed signs of breaking and a new element, foreign relations, began to play its decisive role in determining Rumanian politics. It was only a relative change; Rumania has always been exceedingly sensitive to the reverberations of international events, and the rise of the extremist fascist parties in the 1930's was certainly associated with other similar movements elsewhere in Europe. Nevertheless, it may be said that up to 1936 the most important factors in the Rumanian political scene had been internal: the failure of the democratic parties to establish themselves, the long-standing social tensions and the chronic misery of the peasantry, and the personal influence of King Carol and his entourage. These internal forces continued to exert an important influence but the uneasy equilibrium of 1934 and 1935 was broken by the ascendancy of the European fascist states and the mounting international crisis leading to the Second World War.

Titulescu, the strong advocate of the League and of the Versailles 648 system, and at that time advocate of Little Entente-Soviet collaboration, was removed from the Foreign Office in August, 1936. His fall agrarian problem, which in its broadest sense is the reverse side of 642 the question of industrialization.

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[6] In 1937, in an interview with the journalist Wickham Steed, Carol said that in his own country political parties were sterile and their leaders fit only to criticize. It would be his business as king to discipline them and harness them to constructive work. Notes on the interview are quoted in Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed* (London, n.d.), p. 142.

On the other hand, the tortuous history of Carol's last three years 661 ● as king is of less interest here. Internally, it was the confused un- 642 raveling of the peculiar relations between Carol and the Iron Guard, a vicious if ambiguous struggle between two dictatorial movements. Externally, it was the attempt to ride out the rapidly mounting tempest of the Second World War. Carol, who had mastered the internal situation, was ultimately destroyed by outside events. So while the tumultuous events of the years 1938 to 1940 are of the greatest importance to Rumanian history in general, their relevance to the agrarian question is largely external. Unlike the fall of the Liberals in 1928, the collapse of the peasantist *esprit*, and the creation of a dictatorial regime, all of which are causally related to the agrarian question, Carol's fall was a political and diplomatic rather than an economic transition.

Immediately after removing the Goga cabinet and installing under martial law his new Government of National Union, Carol moved rapidly to create his new order. He abolished the 1923 Constitution and on February 20 promulgated a new corporatist constitution, subsequently ratified by a farcical popular referendum. The new constitution greatly augmented the king's powers, dwarfed the rolè of the legislative bodies, and did away with the party system. Ministers were selected by and responsible solely to the king and had to be of Rumanian nationality for at least three generations. The franchise was limited to citizens over thirty who practiced either agriculture or manual labor, industry or commerce, or intellectual activity; a corporatist concept of the voter replaced universal suffrage. The spirit of organic nationalism pervaded the whole document, stressed the responsibilities of the individual Rumanian to the nation, and circumscribed guarantees of civil rights and liberties. The economic and social outlook of the constitution is shown in Article 7, whereby no Rumanian could advocate by word or letter any changes in the form of the government (all constitutional amendments had to be initiated by the king), the division or distribution of property, exemption from taxes, or class hatred.

At the same time that Carol unseated the old parties by destroying their constitutional base, he attacked the Iron Guard, and in 1938 and 1939 directed an increasingly violent suppression of its formations. The Guard was outlawed, Codreanu was arrested, tried, and imprisoned. In November, 1938, he and thirteen of his followers were shot "while attempting to escape." In September, 1939, the Prime

661 642 Minister, Armand Calinescu, the strongest man in the Carol dictatorship and the executor of the campaign against the Guard, was assassinated. His death was followed by murderous mass reprisals against the Legionaries. Carol seemed to be thoroughly the master of his country.[1]

In place of the disbanded parties he concocted in December, 1938, a single body, the Front of National Rebirth. Through 1938 and 1939 he added the various regalia associated with a corporatist state, but there is little evidence that anyone took these trappings seriously. Administrative and political corruption, always healthy plants in Rumania, blossomed in full splendor in these years; public ethics hit a new low.

648 642 Meanwhile, however, the international situation was closing in and here Carol was caught, as it proved, in a hopeless dilemma. While throughout the 1930's the Rumanian state took on an increasing resemblance to the fascism of the Axis powers, and men of the extreme Right advocated a pro-Axis foreign policy, Rumania, with its interest in maintaining the Versailles system—the guarantor of its territorial integrity—could not be really happy in Axis company. Regardless of internal political developments, and Carol himself repeatedly stressed the difference between internal and external policy, Rumania had strong reason to rely on the Western powers. Germany, however, was clearly in the ascent and the Western powers were pursuing the policy of appeasement. With the collapse of Czechoslovakia after the Munich Conference the Little Entente broke down. In November, 1938, Carol visited both London and Berchtesgaden in an effort to maintain his balance.

The great blow to Rumania's position came with the Soviet-German pact of August, 1939, which forecast common action between the two

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[1] It is impossible to attempt here to clear up the obscurities in the struggle between Carol and the Iron Guard. Numerous interpretations have been made, of which two might be mentioned. The British correspondent, A. L. Easterman, in his book *King Carol, Hitler, and Lupescu* (London, 1942), was of the opinion that in assuming the dictatorship Carol was fighting fire with fire, that he was really anti-Guardist and anti-German. Under this interpretation he was attempting to preserve Rumania from German advances, and his fight against the Guardists, who are regarded as simple German tools, was a part of this national defense. A more complex interpretation is provided by the Rumanian Communist Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu in *Sous trois dictatures*. Briefly, his thesis is that Carol had given secret support to the Guard on his road to the dictatorship, as a means of destroying the bourgeois-democratic parties, but had turned against it because of the potential social ferment it engendered and because the Guard was explicitly pro-Axis, whereas Carol was attempting to play a noncommittal game. Pătrășcanu attributed the increasing violence of the measures employed by Carol against the Guard to the simple fact that having set up a dictatorship himself Carol had no weapon against another dictatorial movement except crude police repression.

665 cal of traditional Rumanian politics and for several years had been in touch with the extremists advocating a "regeneration" of public life.[14] Moreover, while the Iron Guard had been harried under Carol, had lost its top level of leaders as well as much of its popular support, it still had its fighting cadres who felt that their day had come. The army, the only effective opposing force, was at this time badly demoralized by its inaction during the loss of Bessarabia and Transylvania.

665 In the cabinet formed on September 15 Antonescu was head of
● 661 the state; Horia Sima, leader of the Guard, was Deputy Prime Minister; five other ministers were members of the Guard and the rest personal friends of Antonescu. The Guard was declared the sole legal party, responsible for the moral and material uplift of the Rumanian people. While Antonescu had been on good terms with Codreanu for several years and was at this time wearing the Legionary green shirt, tension quickly developed between him and his unruly allies. As a military man he wanted to reestablish law and order, whereas the Guard was champing for its revolution. Within the Guard itself were a number of factions, moderate and extreme, which were disputing Codreanu's mantle.

The pentup violence of the Guard, which had not found satisfaction at the time of Carol's abdication and had not been diverted into other channels, finally broke loose at the end of November, apparently with Horia Sima's approval but without Antonescu's knowledge. The Legionaries incited bloody Jewish pogroms and attempted to wipe out the politicians and civil servants of the previous regime. The army prevented the successful completion of this undertaking, but the Guard did succeed in killing the historian Iorga, the economist Virgil Madgearu, and in massacring sixty-four political prisoners in the Jilava Prison, most of whom had been Carol's agents and police chiefs instrumental in repressing the Legion.

By this time, however, German influence had become decisive. In October, 1940, German troops came into Rumania, ostensibly to reorganize the army; a German economic mission arrived to coordinate the Rumanian economy with the German war machine. The Third Reich's greatest interest was in increasing Rumania's output, and

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ness to fight the Russians, won Hitler's confidence and trust to a surprising degree. See Dr. Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45; Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas* (Bonn, Athenäum-Verlag, 1949), pp. 511–512, 538, 548–549, 574.

[14] Harald Laeuen, *Marschall Antonescu* (Essen, 1943), p. 27.

3. Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 EDl Rumania EDl

for this it required a degree of stability, not the hectic atmosphere 665
created by Guardist terror squads. Consequently, when Antonescu in 661
December began to take measures to bring the Guard to heel, he had German support, although the Legionaries refused to believe that the Germans would desert their most ardent allies. Antonescu proceeded to disarm their formations and to strengthen the army. Seeing their [669]
position undermined, the Guard on January 21, 1941, attempted to revolt. They were suppressed by the army after three days of savage fighting in which they outdid themselves in committing bestial atrocities. On January 27 Antonescu formed a new cabinet composed almost entirely of military officers. The Iron Guard was dissolved, the Legionary state abolished, and a firm military dictatorship under the *Conducator* came into being. Thus fell one of the first fascist movements in Europe and, ironically enough, at just the time Nazi Germany achieved complete predominance in Rumania.

Under the Antonescu dictatorship political life ceased altogether; the army and the Germans were in complete control. A couple of plebiscites provided the necessary stamp of legality and the government, with very few changes, remained in power for the next three years. In June, 1941, Antonescu joined Hitler in the war against the [648]
Soviet Union. Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported the war until the recovery of Bessarabia and Bucovina, though they protested against the dictatorship. After Rumanian troops crossed the Dniester, they dispatched notes of protest to Antonescu demanding Rumania's withdrawal from the war. But by this time he was too deeply involved in the German adventure. In October, 1941, he annexed Transnistria, that part of the Ukraine lying between the Dniester and Bug rivers and including Odessa. Rumanian troops went on and on until they reached Stalingrad. Then began the slow retreat.

Well before his overthrow Antonescu, now a Marshal, realized that the war was lost but was unwilling to take the steps to extricate Rumania, although he permitted envoys of the political parties to establish contact with the Allies. In the absence of effective opposition he was able to maintain power until the Russians, who had been checked in northern Moldavia in the spring of 1944, resumed their offensive in the late summer. With the imminent threat of Rumania becoming a battlefield and being further devastated by increasing American bombing raids, King Michael seized the initiative, arrested him, and sought an armistice.

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The Groza regime, bolstered by the simulacrum of popular support gained in the elections and faced by an opposition unwilling to accept an unwarranted minority position in parliament, undertook in 1947 to wipe out all unfriendly or doubtful political organizations. In the spring it unleashed a new wave of arrests of opposition leaders, arrests made suddenly, at night, and with no explanation. The Communist Minister of Justice, Pătrășcanu, expressed his belief that an uprising was being plotted but said "there was no evidence on hand fixing the responsibility upon former Premier Iuliu Maniu as leader of preparations for a revolution."[11] In July a number of National Peasant leaders, including Mihalache, were caught in an attempt to flee the country; the government arrested Maniu and the top party leadership and outlawed the party, an action which apparently evoked no popular response one way or the other.

Amid much publicity the regime, in November, tried Maniu and his followers, primarily on the charge of conspiring with "Anglo-American imperialism"; as the Communist paper, *Scânteia*, remarked, the United States was really the "twentieth defendant." Some damaging evidence was produced at the trial; observers seem generally to agree that certain members of the National Peasant party were shown to have been in contact with American intelligence officers to discuss means of overthrowing the regime.[12] Maniu, the principal defendant, while perfectly frank in his opinion of the government's illegitimacy and admitting attempting to smuggle National Peasants out of the country for the purpose of organizing resistance abroad, maintained that his opposition was within the framework of international agreements concerning Rumania, agreements which the government had flagrantly violated. But since the regime had effectively blocked any possibility of parliamentary opposition, underground planning—whether actually envisaging violence or not—was the only alternative to complete passivity.

The trial itself was conducted in a manner unhappily too familiar these days: the judge, Colonel Petrescu, was reportedly the director general of all prisons and concentration camps under the Antonescu dictatorship. Maniu and Mihalache were sentenced to terms of life imprisonment, the other leaders to terms ranging from one to twenty-five years. Whatever weight one may attach to the demands of *raison*

[11] See his interview with W. H. Lawrence, *New York Times*, June 25, 1947.

[12] As a matter of fact, as early as the spring of 1945 a number of Rumanians, some of whom had close connections with the Liberal and National Peasant parties, were developing underground plans for ousting the Groza government and sought to enlist American support. The charges of plots against the regime were not pure concoctions, whatever the purpose of the trial may have been.

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

175 *d'état*—and it is obvious that Maniu and Mihalache did represent a threat to the Groza government—it is absurd to regard in any manner their sentences as an act of justice. ● 661

While the Maniu trial was in progress, the controlled press raised a clamor against Tătărescu and pointed out, quite correctly, that many anti-Groza elements were being sheltered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service. Tătărescu's position had been weakening for some time. In June, 1947, he had circulated a memorandum which contained a fifteen-point proposal for changing internal and external policy: he assailed the government's economic policy, expressed alarm over the country's low economic output, which was still at only 48 per cent of the 1938 level, requested better treatment of foreign capital and less stifling state intervention, and criticized the number of preventive arrests and the poor prison conditions. The Communists were naturally displeased by this note which clearly exceeded the conventions of "criticism and self-criticism." Rumors circulated of Tătărescu's resignation, and in September he was obliged to dismiss several hundred employees in the Foreign Office. On November 5 the parliament passed a vote of no confidence in him; the following day he and the other Dissident Liberal cabinet members were removed from their posts, to be replaced by Ana Pauker at the Foreign Office and Vasile Luca at the Ministry of Finance. (In December Bodnaraş took over the Ministry of War. The real rulers of the country were at last assuming governmental positions.)

Thus ended the political career of an able if unscrupulous man, who had first attracted attention in the early 1920's for his efficient action against the Communists and who had threaded a devious course through Carol's reign. Though disliked and mistrusted by all political groups, he seems to have had a rather Talleyrandian interest in the welfare of Rumania as he saw it.

Plans for the merger of the Social Democratic and Communist parties were announced in the autumn of 1947, though this amalgamation, which was in effect the complete absorption of the Social Democrats within a Leninist-Stalinist organization and ideology, was not completed until the following spring. It seems to have met with the sincere if ineffectual opposition of most of the socialists, some of whom joined Titel Petrescu's Independent Socialist party.[13] The Petrescu faction, however, was subject to increasing attack and

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[13] For an account of this last, faltering episode in the career of the Social Democratic party, see Valentin Thoma, "Wie es zur Liquidierung des rumänischen Sozialismus kam," *Die Zukunft* (July, 1949).

175 charged with illegally distributing political leaflets; on May 6, 1948, Petrescu was arrested and kept in prison without trial.

●661 On December 30, 1947, King Michael, an anomalous monarch in a universe of burgeoning people's democracies, was suddenly and rather unexpectedly forced to abdicate. At the time he said his abdication was voluntary but subsequently, after his departure from Rumania, announced that it had been made under duress and he could not regard it as binding. Government propaganda became increasingly unfriendly to the king and listed with great relish the castles, forest land, and industrial shares that reverted to the nation. Following the overthrow of the monarchy the government at once announced the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română) and prepared the draft of a new constitution.

Having thus eliminated the monarchy and all overt political opposition, the Communists then turned to the task of removing disaffected or doubtful elements in their own ranks. In the autumn of 1947 Gheorghiu-Dej, commenting on the rapid growth of the Rumanian Communist party to 7[illegible]0,000 members, had criticized the "low political and ideological level of our cadres and the presence of chauvinism among party members." In the course of a three-day congress of Communists and Social Democrats, assembled in February, 1948, to ratify their unification in a United Workers party, Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu launched an attack on the Communist Minister of Justice Pătrăşcanu, whom he charged with falling under bourgeois influence and overestimating the forces of the enemy, the Western powers. Pătrăşcanu was removed from his post and from the Central Committee of the party; later reports have suggested his being a likely candidate for a purge trial such as the other people's democracies have enjoyed.

There had been friction between Pătrăşcanu, a local Communist, and the "Muscovites," Pauker and Luca, since before the installation of the Groza regime. They found him too nationalistic and he was undoubtedly alarmed by the heavy, mechanically brutal tactics of the new order, its complete disregard of the nation's sensitivities, and its absolute subservience to Soviet state demands. Without question, many of the same elements which created Titoism and similar national heresies in the Communist camp were present in the Rumanian party, but because of the basic weakness of the Communist movement in Rumania and the ineluctable dependence upon the Soviet Union they never had a chance of obtaining control.

668 In February, 1948, the Communists concocted a new Democratic Popular Front, comprising the United Workers party; the Plough-

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

men's Front, which had absorbed the dissident National Peasants to become a united peasant party; the National Popular party, which dissolved itself a year later on the grounds that the intellectuals and representatives of the middle class supporting this artificial organization should henceforth work within the cadres of the "mass parties"; and the Hungarian Popular party, controlled by the Communists but presumably designed to represent the Hungarian minority. On March 28 this bloc conducted and won elections, against a wholly spurious opposition, for a new assembly to vote on the constitution. 668

The Constitution of 1948 closely resembled the 1947 Constitution of the Bulgarian People's Republic and was clearly derived from and inspired by the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Apart from the fact that the latter is concerned with the union of a number of constituent republics, the principal differences reflect the transitional character of the so-called popular democracy. The People's Republic is defined as arising from the struggle against fascism, reaction, and imperialism rather than from the overthrow of landlords and capitalists. Private property is still recognized as one form of ownership of the means of production, though it is circumscribed by the "general interest" and subject to expropriation and nationalization. The Communist party does not have the preeminent status it enjoys in the U.S.S.R. As in the Soviet constitution stress is laid upon the right to work, to have leisure, and to receive an education; civil liberties, freedom of the press and of speech are guaranteed, but clearly for proletarian purposes; the right of association may not be directed against the democratic order established by the constitution. The supreme organ of the state is the unicameral Grand National Assembly, headed by a Presidium; the executive branch of the government is the Council of Ministers.[14] 642

Since the adoption of the constitution there have been few important structural changes in the government but rather a consolidation of the regime, the reorganization of the administration and the army (which apparently now exceeds treaty limits), and a running fight to eliminate the remnants of political opposition and to subdue sporadic uprisings brought about by the extensive new economic activities. A series of well-advertised public trials continued through 1948 and 1949, against Liberals, industrialists, military officers, students, Catholic and Uniate clergy, and Zionists, all categories that might cause the regime trouble or embarrassment. The new legal apparatus, including the addition of "people's assessors" to assure 661 642

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[14] For a recent study of constitutional developments within the Soviet sphere, see Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, 1949).

proletarian justice and the introduction of the death penalty for
•661 treason, espionage, and economic sabotage, proved an efficient weapon
642 in this attack. The creation, announced in January, 1949, of People's Councils as the organs of local government was to provide the basic
[647] unit for the administrative hierarchy and to pave the way to a socialist society. In September, 1949, a State Control Commission was formed "to develop the spirit of responsibility toward public property, to wipe out bureaucracy, to verify the carrying out of government decrees, and to prevent sabotage in the work of building socialism." Avram Bunaciu, Pătrășcanu's tougher successor at the Ministry of Justice, became head of this commission, which promised to be a very formidable instrument.

642 Along with the consolidation and coordination of the political and administrative apparatus came a marked shift in the party line from what it had been at the end of the war. The original program sought a government friendly to the U.S.S.R. and in which the workers' front would operate in coalition with middle-class parties. After 1947 not only the fact but even the pretense of collaboration was dropped. At the end of that year Gheorghiu-Dej said,

> The resignation of Tătărescu and his group means the removal of the last representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie from the government; it means that the proletariat and its allies no longer share state power with the representatives of the exploiting classes. . . . The proletarian vanguard, in close alliance with the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia, is the backbone of the government.[15]

By 1949 the People's Democracy was explicitly defined as fulfilling the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was distinguished from the Soviet form because it was possible, through the assistance of the U.S.S.R., to establish the dictatorship without civil war. In the People's Democracy, unlike the Soviet, the old state apparatus was not immediately smashed; bourgeois elements were retained for a time.

> But only with the establishment of People's Councils—local organs of state power built on broad democratic lines—will the new state apparatus be created, corresponding from top to bottom in every way with the aims and tasks of the new state and adjusted to the tasks of building Socialism. . . . The establishment of the People's Councils signifies

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[15] *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (January 1, 1948). (Published in Belgrade until December, 1948; subsequently in Bucarest.)

3: Roberts S-4 (no date)1951 ED1 Rumania ED1

culture is growing apace."[33] Nevertheless, in the spring of 1948 000
Gheorghiu-Dej was denying rumors that the land would be taken 423
back from the peasants, and a decree in March permitted peasants 656
possessing more land than they could till to employ day laborers.[34] 665

By the summer, however, the government was emphasizing the need of "sharpening the class struggle in the countryside, organizing agricultural laborers, and fighting the rich peasant." It introduced progressive scales of taxation and forced grain delivery aimed at preventing accumulation of grain or wealth by kulak or estate owner and ultimately undermining their economic position. It set up "village information offices" with instructions to "unmask all the dishonest kulaks and inform the farmers of their duties."

On March 2, 1949, the regime, on the simple sweeping charge of sabotage and failure to comply with regulations, seized the land, livestock, and inventory which had been left to the large landowners under the 1945 reform. In this action, carried out abruptly and without prior notification, some 17,000 families were evicted from their homes at night and sent to various resettlement areas. The government now directed all its energies against the rich peasants.[35] Lenin's dictum that "Small-scale exploitation generates capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, in an elemental way, and on a mass scale," again made its appearance and became the leitmotiv for innumerable articles.

Embroidering on this theme, Gheorghiu-Dej marked out the party 423
line for 1949. In 1945 the landlords had been liquidated as a class, 565
but this act fostered small-scale economic activity in agriculture. "It 661 ●
follows that the complete victory of socialism is impossible so long as private property in the means of production, in the towns and in the countryside, including private property in land, continues to exist." The Communist party, therefore, had a number of important

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[33] *East Europe* (February 19, 1948).

[34] *Ibid.* (April 1, 1948).

[35] The distinction between poor, middle, and rich peasant, or kulak, is not based on size of holding or amount of wealth alone and seems to take on different meanings under different political circumstances. In simplest terms, the rich peasant is one who hires labor or charges rent for machinery and equipment; the middle peasant uses only family labor but produces enough, or more than enough, to support his household; the poor peasant is unable to support himself on his holding and is on the verge of drifting into the agricultural proletariat. In 1941, 12 per cent of the land in Rumania was farmed solely by paid labor, and 21.8 per cent by a mixture of paid and family labor. The first category, in the main, represented the properties of estate owners, the second the holdings of the richer peasants. In 1948, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, 57 per cent of the rural population belonged to the small peasantry and 33 per cent to the middle peasantry.

423 tasks. The first was to restrict the kulaks and dislodge them from
565 their position. Then it would be possible "when conditions are ripe,
● 661 to pass over to the policy of the complete liquidation of the kulaks."[36]
He anticipated, of course, that the kulaks would resort to underground struggle, sabotage, and criminal acts in an effort to avert their approaching fate.

185 The second task was to undertake propaganda convincing the poor
241 and middle peasants of the need to unite in collective farms. When that task had been achieved, when all the land belonged to the collectives in perpetuity, the goal of making the land public property and bringing about the socialist transformation of the countryside would be reached. Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized, however, the necessity of making this transition gradually, by means of persuasion, and with the voluntary support of the peasant. The poor peasants should not be driven into collectives, the middle peasant should not be identified with the kulak, and the whole process must be paced by the development of agricultural machinery, machine tractor stations, and the expansion of the network of consumer and producer cooperatives as broad mass movements.[37] These words of caution presumably reflect the wisdom gained from the Soviet experiment in collectivization.

Gheorghiu-Dej concluded his remarks with the inevitable "self-criticism": in the past the party had not provided a clear political line for work in the countryside and had failed to popularize the notion of uniting the working peasantry into collective farms, and had even ignored or denied this goal.[38] That these so-called errors were the fault of the Rumanian Communists is, of course, nonsense. The party line, emanating from Moscow, had shifted, and in this instance a strong case can be made that the change had been planned long in advance. The Communists could have had no intention of stopping at the stage of small peasant cultivation which had, in any event, reached a cul-de-sac in Rumania.

474 The creation of collective farms got under way in 1949, and by the end of the year, according to the glowing account of a Russian visitor, 56 *kolkhozi* comprising 4,000 peasant families had been estab-

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[36] As in Russia representatives of the restricted and soon to be liquidated kulak class are not to be admitted to the collective farms.

[37] The cooperatives, however, must rid themselves of capitalist elements, must intensify their collaboration with the state trading organs, and must promote the spirit of "socialist emulation" among the peasants.

[38] G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Tasks of the Rumanian Workers Party in the Struggle for the Socialist Reorganization of the Countryside," *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy* (Bucarest, March 15, 1949).

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a [668] movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to 642 648 office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment [423] dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the 652 country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into 665 the special domain of the Bratianus[1] and so by provoking 661 their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On [664] the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

[1] [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu -- Analyst]

[652] the economic crisis which had become endemic, sought to
665 withdraw for a brief period from office in order that popular
661 indignation might be appeased. As it had become obvious, however, that the Opposition, headed by the Transylvanian and peasant groups of the old kingdom aided by the Bessarabians, would sweep the polls and deprive the Bratianu party of the privileges it had arrogated to itself during its last tenure of office, the government manoeuvred to appoint in its stead a political group on whose subservience it could count. The choice fell on General Averescu, who could not pretend to independence of action owing to the numerical weakness of his group, and who was forced to act in leading strings held by the Bratianus on account of his absolute dependence on their support. As a consequence of the prevailing exasperation throughout the country it could be foreseen with certainty that it would be impossible to secure a favourable majority at the election following the exit from office of the Bratianus, even if use was made of the devices habitually employed on such occasions.

666 Before the dissolution of the Chamber, therefore, the
646 Bratianus passed a law reforming the electoral system then in use, which completely altered the very essence of democratic government. By the new system a party obtaining 40% of the total votes cast secured 70% of the seats in the Chamber, and thereby a party which did not possess the support of the majority of the electors might nevertheless secure an imposing majority in the Legislative Chamber. Through the passing of this measure into law, the coming to power of unpopular parties and royal favourites has been made possible, for owing to the malpractices and abuses current at elections, it is relatively easy in Rumania for any person in control of the state-machine to secure the requisite 40% of the votes necessary to ensure him complete domination of the Chamber.

666 In ordinary circumstances there would have been no necessity for this electoral law, since the public has usually a very wholesome respect for whatever party is in power, allowing it to organize the elections to suit its wishes, and permitting it to exert a dominating influence on the polls so that it may be said that the elections are always "made."

THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The elections which followed in May, 1926, were among the 666
most violent which had been witnessed in Rumania. Though 661
the Averescu group had secured the support of the Magyars,
Germans, Jews, Bulgarians and Turks by holding out to
them the most alluring promises, it in no way felt secure,
and therefore had recourse to extensive terrorist methods.
Most Opposition leaders were arrested. Opposition leaders
like Maniu and Vaida-Voevod were prevented from holding
meetings. Mihalache was set upon by gendarmes and beaten
at his home at Topoloveni. The Bessarabian leaders, Stere
and Halippa, while travelling to Bessarabia were ignominiously
thrown out of their train at Floresti, placed under an
escort of gendarmes and conveyed on foot to Cetatea-Alba,
a distance of 300 kilometers, despite the fact that they were
both in a poor state of health at the time. The army and
gendarmerie were mobilized and ordered to see to it that
Rumanian citizens did their duty (such as it was conceived
to be by the government of H.M. King Ferdinand of
Rumania). One of the manifestos issued and distributed
broadcast by army air-planes at the time read:—"If you
trust in the King then you must trust in his government."
As for the way royalty in Rumania conceived its duty of 643
guarding the letter and spirit of the Constitution, one may 666
judge by the fact that the King, aware of the violence to be
committed, and knowing that as the supreme arbiter in the
country he would be besought from all sides to intervene and
put a stop to it, could think of nothing better than to elude
his responsibilities by betaking himself to his yacht, and
cruising on the Danube for a whole week so as not to be
importuned by the complaints of his liege subjects!

In spite of the unprecedented violence employed the 666
government obtained only 54% of the total votes cast, but
it must be remembered that this percentage included almost
the whole of the votes cast by the minorities.

For some time Averescu meekly followed the lead of 642
Bratianu. He surprised nobody, however, when he began 661
to show manifest signs of insubordination, but to no avail.

For the Liberals, knowing the shifty customer with whom they were dealing, had taken their precautions. During their four years of office they had bestowed on most of the

661 state administrations a certain degree of autonomy which,
[642] effectively amputated the central government of many of its
prerogatives, and having filled these administrations with their own partisans they still exerted an influence which could, if necessary, paralyse the governments destined to succeed them in office.

In his electoral manifestoes, Averescu had held out to the Rumanians the most seductive inducements, among others that of a flow of foreign capital into the country. Time passed, however, and so, without any sign of an impending materialization of these assurances, the public began to chafe and inveigh against him. The resentment which the Liberals had aroused against themselves was thus deftly diverted on to the heads of their successors. This result having been duly effected, the Liberals emerged from the seclusion they had hitherto voluntarily imposed on themselves, and now appeared on the scene in the guise of indispensable factors for the restoration of the order and legality so grievously compromised by their incompetent henchman! The King was induced to demand General Averescu to form a coalition Ministry, but after a fruitless effort he was summarily dismissed and replaced by Prince Stirbey, who a fortnight later retired, making way for a Bratianu Government, so that the transition might not appear too brusque.

643 King Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and as the crown passed to his grandson, Michael, a boy of six, a Regency Council was nominated. Ferdinand's son, the notorious Prince Carol, had been excluded from the throne owing to Ferdinand's conviction that Rumania's prestige would suffer if a person with Carol's record became King. A similar opinion seems to have been held by our Foreign Office, for when Prince Carol came over to England in 1925 he received a polite but firm request to leave our shores.

665 Unhappily for the Liberals, their leader, John Bratianu, died suddenly in November, 1927. His was a strong willed and dominating personality, capable, but not over scrupulous in the choice of methods. The leadership then passed
to his brother, who until then had been Minister of Finance.
665 The rising storm of popular exasperation caused by the
652 financial policy of the Liberal party, which had brought the

671 preparing a system of regional decentralization which would largely have satisfied the desires of the minorities.

662 Having to rely upon an inefficient administrative staff, with the various autonomous State departments still filled with supporters of the Opposition, and the latter hampering and undermining the government's attempt to clear up the mess in which the country had been left, it was hardly possible to expect that the government of M. Maniu could effect the miraculous change that was expected of it. In order to counteract the underhand machinations of its Liberal opponents, who did not scruple even to sap its credit
642 abroad by circulating scurrilous attacks on it among foreign
643 banking institutions, while at home they brought pressure
661 to bear on the Regency (which had been elected at their
dictation) to create irritating hindrances to the smooth working of the government's plans, the latter at last allowed itself to be won over to what at the time was a fairly popular view, namely that of permitting the former Crown Prince Carol to return and ascend the throne. His advent was reckoned as likely to strengthen the hands of the Government, for he shared with the National Peasant Party the hostility of the Bratianus. Carol II, however, after his accession to the throne on June 8th, 1930, began to manifest a distinct predilection for autocratic measures. He arbitrarily removed from his post the able Rumanian Minister in Paris, M. Diamandi, a man who had distinguished himself for years by his devoted and brilliant service to his country, and nominated a personal friend whose sole qualification for this important diplomatic post was that he was a racing man. He estranged both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod by unconstitutionally interfering in the government, and thereby provoked the resignation of both. As he did not yet feel himself strong enough to dissolve the Chamber he allowed the National Peasant Party to form another Cabinet with M. Mironescu at its head, but he imposed on them as colleague an outsider in the person of M. Manoilescu, another personal friend of his. An attempt was made to form a Coalition Cabinet to be presided over by M. Titulescu, but as this failed the Mironescu Cabinet was tolerated for a time because it was conducting negotiations for a loan, and a premature

disclosure of the impending adoption of a dictatoral régime 642 might have influenced them adversely. Once the loan was 643 obtained, and when it was deemed that the favour with [661] which the National Peasant Party was regarded had somewhat subsided, owing to the unpopular budget measures it had adopted, M. Mironescu was forced to resign, and death having removed in the meantime the most determined adversary of the King, M. Vintila Bratianu, the former now proceeded to unfold his plan of action.

M. Titulescu was once more summoned to Bucarest and asked to form a broad Coalition Cabinet; but as the National Peasant Party refused to lend its support to a cabinet which would have contained two royal favourites, Manoilescu and Argentoianu, M. Titulescu wisely abandoned the task and returned to London.

The next step of Carol was an attempt to follow the nefarious example of his brother-in-law, the Serbian monarch, and form a military cabinet, but the Spanish revolution which broke out at the time induced him hastily to alter his plans.

M. Argentoianu, who had in the meantime become the 645 favourite adviser of the King, opted for the dissolution of the Chamber and the formation of a cabinet of " technical " experts to shore up the tottering framework; himself to occupy the two most important posts, those of the Ministry of Finances and of the Interior. The technical capacities of M. Argentoianu are of peculiarly sinister character, judging from what former colleagues of his have to say of his activities. Thus General Averescu, in whose cabinet he held the post of Minister of Finances ad-interim, accuses him of unconstitutionally squandering £1,500,000, of thereby defrauding the State, and rendering himself liable to penalties provided in Art. 326 of the Rumanian penal code, as well as in Art. 3 of the law regarding ministerial responsibilities—infractions that had been established by the Judicial authorities in 1923, if we are to trust General Averescu's affirmations as they were published and reproduced in a series of articles in all the principal Bucarest newspapers during January, 1932. Another ex-Finance Minister, M. Virgil Madgearu, on whose integrity we may rely, likewise

POLITICS.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

The Liberal or Bratianu Party.—The regular system of 665
party government composed of two great political parties, 647
the Liberal and Conservative, which had ruled alternatively in Rumania during the reign of Charles I, came to a close with the Great War, which brought about the dismemberment of the Conservatives. It was an arrangement based on the "spoils" system, and entailed a change of the majority of state officials with every change of government. This instability of tenure of all posts in the Civil Service necessarily encouraged corruption, but it may be said that it was a political system which for the time being made on the whole for stability and assured to Rumania an immunity from revolts and crimes by which other States of South Eastern Europe had distinguished themselves during the same period.

It is regrettable that both parties had neglected to create a 665
contented class of peasant proprietors which would have constituted a sound bulwark against the onset of disintegrating forces let loose by the war. Instead, great land and financial monopolies closely connected with the personnel of these two political parties were fostered.

The agrarian revolution led to the elimination of the 661
Conservatives, while the Liberal party retained its vigour 665
owing to its grip on the economic life of the country. Owing to the absence of a powerful rival, the Liberal party became the supreme arbiter in the land during the first decade following the conclusion of the war. But, from a political party it had degenerated into a coterie aiming solely at the exploitation of the country for the benefit of its partisans, and, as such, though firmly established in the old kingdom, seeing that it constituted the main avenue by which one could accede to political life, it was unable to extend its influence in the newly incorporated provinces, where, fortunately, other political conceptions prevailed.

It had identified itself with the Bratianu family, which 665
exerted an autocratic sway over it. After John Bratianu's death, in 1927, the leadership passed to his brother Vintila

666 vinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one 665 hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. The nation is in the midst of disquieting social and economic troubles, and is being conducted by inexperienced and unprepared men, deprived of intuition and without inspiration. In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity. I beg of you that momentary incitations should not be allowed to trouble the purity of your devotion to the ideal of the unity of our State. . . . Uphold the unity of the National Peasant Party because it is by its aid that we shall revert to a democratic and constitutional life and extricate the peasantry and the whole social structure from its present wretchedness. Do not forget that you have to fight for a policy of equity towards the provinces. . . . . We have the advantage of having a youthful king of our own generation. We have received him with justified enthusiasm, and we believe that thanks to the qualities with which he is endowed, he will respond to the people's heartfelt desire and lead it accordingly."

665 This policy of passivity, hitherto followed, seems to have reached its close, for all of a sudden on May 14th, 1932, the "Patria" published a vehement attack on the government which may be taken as the preliminary move in a systematic campaign aiming at its removal. This fulminating article created a sensation in Bucarest, and hopes were expressed that this rebellious attitude of the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant party would not meet with the approval of its partisans in the old kingdom, but fortunately for the Rumanian people these forebodings were soon dispelled when the Bucarest organ of the party, the "Dreptatea," announced that this campaign had the full support of the party behind it. A concise summary of the above mentioned article in the "Patria" is given below as it indicates very clearly not only the wrongs inflicted on Transylvania, but also that the patience of the people is at an end.

661 "Transylvania and the Banat have been reduced to the 668 state of colonies left to the discretion of illiterate exploiters.

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1
Transylvania

Eighty-six per cent of the State revenue is being raised this 661 year in our province. Transylvania forms one-third of the 668 total territory of Rumania, and possesses only one-fifth of the total wealth of the country; how then can this imposition of 86% of the total burden of taxation on our province be justified?

This oligarchy at Bucarest constitutes a gigantic swindle which has transgressed all limits and which in any other civilized State would long since have been blown up from its very foundations, so that every trace of this moral ugliness which disgraces this country should be removed. We do not enjoy equality of treatment with other Rumanians, for we have been excluded from appointments in the army, the customs, the railways, the post, the administration and the magistrature. We are far from being autonomists, but we will ask whether under such circumstances it is possible to stem for long the claim for autonomy. In all corners of the country people begin to display restlessness. They demand that a campaign be opened not only against the government but also especially against the present régime which aims at despoiling the nation of its birth-rights. This campaign will soon begin and citizens will have the privilege of sacrificing themselves for the purpose of securing the return of a constitutional régime. It will be a campaign of extreme violence in the course of which nobody will be spared.

The present economic disaster which we are experiencing is to a great part due to the disorderly conduct of State affairs from which Rumanians of the provinces have been excluded. For decades the provinces have been subjected to a policy of pauperization and political serfdom. We raise a solemn protest and warning that the time is not distant when Rumanians of the provinces will no longer tolerate these adventurers and political mountebanks who treat the provinces as colonies fit only to be exploited." . . . .

This overt and frank criticism of Bucarest circles naturally 661 excited a certain indignation in the Rumanian capital, yet independent papers like the "Adeverul" were courageous enough to express a certain sympathy. In its issue of 15th May, 1932, the latter journal regrettfully admitted "it is probable that this warning from across the Carpathians will

664 have no effect. Not even now, when events in Yugoslavia should serve as a lesson to us."

665 *General Averescu's "People's Party."*—General Averescu had distinguished himself during the war and on its conclusion initiated a campaign demanding the taking of severe sanctions against all those who by their ineptitude or moral falterings had contributed to bring humiliation on Rumania during the war. His appeal rallied to his side the majority of the ex-soldiers, mainly peasants, and this led him to espouse their demand for a rapid distribution of the land among them. He is a determined upholder of an iron-hand policy and it is owing mainly to his advocacy of strong measures that he was called to the government in 1920, at a time when the country was threatened with upheavals brought about by the dilatory fashion in which the allocation of the land to the peasants was being conducted. His maintenance in office for almost two years at the time was due mainly to the support given to him by M. Take Jonescu, who acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in his Cabinet.

This group is a purely personal coterie and has no enduring connection with any section of the people. Whenever it has assumed office it has done so by support other than that of the people. General Averescu expected that on the return of King Carol II from exile, he would be entrusted with the task of putting things in order in Rumania. But hope deferred has shattered his faith in his sovereign's capacity of discernment, and at last his chagrin at being shunned has led him to take up an uncompromising attitude towards the Crown, against which he has launched a vehement press campaign. Some of his partisans, headed by his former lieutenant Goga, have in consequence receded from the party and have founded a separate political organization. Goga is in intimate relation with the Palace, and it is rumoured that the Iorga-Argentoianu Cabinet may eventually be replaced by a political combination including the triumvirate Goga, Lupu, and Argentoianu

Dr Lupu's Peasant Party.—This is another small personal coterie which for some time had adhered to the National Peasant Party. It is practically of no importance, but by lending its feeble support to reaction it can help to turn the

563 647 bought at random during his brief stays in Rumania. These quotations have not been specially selected and they may be considered as generally descriptive of what is being said on Bessarabia in the Rumanian press. If one were to study the latter assiduously there is no doubt that a vast quantity of incriminating matter could easily be adduced to form a most damning indictment of the incapacity of Rumanian governments.

● 661 563 647 " Lupta," Dec. 8th, 1931 :—After the union,[1] the men who were most compromised were dispatched there[2] to work for the spiritual unification of the nation; at any rate they were individuals utterly incapable of understanding the ideal or the scope of the mission which had been confided to them. The administrative authorities were constituted entirely of the scum of the political parties of the old kingdom. It is to these social dregs that the errand of infusing into the Bessarabians a sentiment of confidence in us was entrusted. How they fulfilled this mission, how they alienated even those who trusted us, is well known. Bessarabia was and remains a sort of land of promise for those desirous to grow rich quick . . . not by honest means . . . after a self-imposed exile accepted solely for this purpose. Enrichment being the sole initial and final aim of these propagandists sent out from the old kingdom, they inaugurate a state of affairs which conforms with their pursuits. Persecutions of all sorts, inquisitorial constraints of all manifestations of collective and individual liberty. All corners of Bessarabia were represented as fertile for the culture of Bolshevism. For thirteen years we have heard of nothing else concerning this province save terrorist plots and communist actions all purporting to aim at the dissolution of the Rumanian State. Those interested, created purposely a state of affairs that completely denaturalized existing facts and finally succeeded in imposing their conception on "the administrative machinery of Bessarabia," &c. The paper concludes by relating how workmen and intellectuals are persecuted, imprisoned, subjected to all sorts of vexations by the Rumanian authorities at Kichineff and at other urban centres.

The " Cuvantul " of Feb. 20th, 1929, designates Bessarabia as " the sick man of Rumania." The Bratianu

[1] [of Bessarabia with Rumania—Analyst] [2] [Bessarabia—Analyst]

régime had consummated Bessarabia's ruin, and its people 563
were dying of hunger. The irruption of the Rumanian army 647
was not the triumphal arrival of a liberator but the invasion 661
of a hunger-stricken horde. The requisitions for obtaining supplies both for the army and for the population of Moldavia, on account of the haste and disorder with which they were carried out, assumed the aspect of revolting spoliations and led the natives to ask "what sort of brothers are these hogs and these robbers?"

"Our army's attitude was both offensive and aggressive, in conformity with the usages of war, in short, that of an army of occupation in an enemy country. When the time came to organize the civil administration of Bessarabia, very few of the regular functionaries agreed to be transferred to a remote and unsafe province. . . . Adventurers, those who had nothing to lose and who were under the threat of being dismissed or imprisoned, accepted to join in this "campaign to Siberia" in the hope of being rehabilitated or of becoming rich. For a long time the transfer of a civil functionary to Bessarabia was considered as a redoubtable disciplinary sanction. . . . ."

"The Bessarabians have found out what elements we can contribute to the restoration of their former material prosperity. These are poverty, demoralization, political debauchery, a decade of violence, fraud and illegality. Hence the permanent hostility with which they regard us; a state of irritability which is maintained owing to the prevailing wretchedness."

The main responsibility for this astounding state of affairs 665
should be ascribed to the Bratianus, who inaugurated and 578
maintained this system for ten years. When finally they were ejected from office, their Bessarabian partisans began to quarrel among themselves and attack most virulently their former regional leader, M. Inculeţ. They started a paper called "The Voice of Bessarabia" in 1929, in which their former leaders were denounced as vulgar and dangerous adventurers, robbers and criminals. As for their former local chief Inculeţ, he was accused of having retired to Jassi in order to enjoy in peace the thousands of millions he had accumulated by a triple betrayal of Russia, Bessarabia, and

646 Rumania. The paper concluded by an exhortation addressed
571 to Bessarabians to evict Inculeţ from the political arena of Bessarabia where he had operated as though this region had been an African colony, and the appeal concluded with the hortatory incitation "Eject this putrefaction from Bessarabia."

In spite of the severe financial crisis which afflicted this
651 region, the fiscal agents of the government insisted on
563 collecting taxes even when in years of drought the peasantry
● 661 was destitute and utterly unable to pay. The methods employed were so barbarous that they provoked several interpellations in the Rumanian Chamber. During its sitting of Dec. 10th, 1926, M. V. Madgearu denounced the abusive and inquisitorial methods by which Bessarabian tax-payers had been sold up and his arraignment was confirmed by similar indictments formulated by a member of the (then) government majority.

423 In October, 1930, a revolt broke out in southern Bess-
563 arabia. The peasants of the village of Baimaklia, near the town of Kagui, revolted and burned down the residence of a
661 big landowner because certain grazing lands were given to him by the State instead of being distributed among the peasants. That similar abuses are current may be inferred from an article in the "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, which is headed "The pauperization and humiliation of the Bessarabians," and in which it is related how certain State lands were put up for sale at Balţi, and though the peasantry of six adjoining villages had combined and offered 400,000 lei more than three big landowners, the lands were allocated to the latter, obviously through favouritism. That State functionaries often act with an arbitrariness and brutality
563 inconceivable in a civilized State may be illustrated by
661 the Soroca affair, which is of quite recent occurrence. In January, 1932, six Jewish youths, inhabitants of Soroca, on the Dniester, after coming to terms with the frontier-guards as to the amount of the bribe they would have to pay to be allowed to escape into Russia, and after they had paid 40,000 lei, were ambuscaded and shot down. In order to instil terror into the local population, their bodies were hurled pell-mell on a sledge which was driven by a soldier

sitting on the corpses through the streets of Soroca and conveyed to the mortuary. Such barbarous conduct naturally aroused bitter indignation which was re-echoed in the Bucarest press and was qualified "as a premeditated massacre," and the Rumanian Government was severely censured for providing Russia by such acts, good motives for anti-Rumanian propaganda. ("Adeverul" 10th Jan. 1932.) Such cases do not seem to be rare, for the same journal in its issue for the 20th Jan. reports the perpetration of a similar outrage at Balţi, when two persons were shot down by the frontier guards after they had secured their tacit permission to cross into Soviet Russia. It is obvious that if Russia exerts such a magnetic attraction on the Bessarabians as to incite them to abandon their belongings, disburse considerable sums in tolls, and endanger their lives in order to gain admittance to what they consider a haven of comparative repose, conditions in Bessarabia must be truly unendurable. At any rate the Iorga-Argentoianu Government has not so far shown any disposition to grapple more vigorously than its predecessors in office with this aggravating question of Bessarabian maladministration; on the contrary it has followed meekly in the footsteps of its predecessors. Thus, in the "Adeverul" for Jan. 28th, 1932, we read of a protest of Bessarabian intellectuals who denounced the favouritism shown by the Government for two of its political friends, who, after being munificently supplied with funds, were dispatched to Bessarabia in order to start the publication of a newspaper whose ostensible object was the spreading of Rumanian culture in that province. This dilapidation of government funds in favour of "budgetivorous" persons having no connection whatever with Bessarabia was strongly resented by Bessarabian intellectuals, who deemed themselves the sole persons qualified to carry on such propaganda in what they considered as their private domain. Bucarest governments have always shown themselves incapable of facing grave questions seriously, and one ought not to be surprised at their dalliance with the question of Bessarabia. Their latest device for placating the Bessarabians was to create two new Under-Secretaries of State and fill these posts with natives of Bessarabia. "The new system,"

563 ironically remarked the "Adeverul," "of dealing with
661 the woes of Bessarabia consists of appointing a Minister for Bessarabia at Bucarest, while a Bessarabian whose sole qualification is that of having published a book of poems is nominated to the post of Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. This is the government's conception of putting a stop to the agitation in Bessarabia, but alas ! the satisfaction of two vanities does not mean that the problems appertaining to the region between the Pruth and the Dniester are approaching solution."

In another article the "Adeverul" takes the Government to task for creating fresh sinecures and sarcastically exclaims that Bessarabia must be happy since she has now two ministers. The Government felt constrained to declare that these two new posts would not create a very heavy additional charge on the budget as it had arranged that the Governor of Bessarabia would give up his salary to his new colleague, but the "Adeverul" retorted that if the Governor gave up his salary, he being a general, would draw a pension, so that there would still be an increase in expenditure, all the more so, since a salary had to be provided for the new Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. That the creation of posts for new under secretaries of State is highly unpopular may be seen from a report of a sitting of the Senate early in April, 1932, when Senator Banescu formally demanded the abolition of five such posts declaring that it was a shame to create new charges when the State had not the means wherewith to pay its pensioners. The Opposition was reported to have loudly applauded him, shouting "it is tragic, people are dying of hunger."

433 The dissatisfaction existing in Bessarabia has been intensified through the economic crisis which had become endemic in that province since its separation from Russia, and which the Rumanian authorities so far have done nothing to alleviate or to assuage. Bessarabia was one of the most fertile and productive provinces of the Russian Empire, the latter providing a ready market for Bessarabian produce. Its orchards and vineyards were famous and provided annually some 28,800 tons of fruit of a value of 5 milliard

INNER GLIMPSES OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

It is with no desire to cast discredit on the Rumanians that 000
the following political happenings related in this chapter are being published, but with the intent of giving, judging from the past, a rough idea of the mentality of the ruling classes and what may be expected of them in the future. It would be utterly unfair if we were to judge them after our western conceptions and by accepting our standard of morality as a criterion. "The moral standards of a people are evolved in correspondence with the practical needs of that people" wrote our distinguished philosopher, the late L. T. Hobhouse, in his remarkable treatise "Mind in Evolution," and the auspices under which Rumania evolved were peculiarly unpropitious if we are to judge from Dr. Seton Watson's weighty pronouncement that "the Phanariot régime reduced the national and religious life of the peninsula to utter stagnation and has left its corroding mark upon the politics of every Balkan nation." ("Europe in the Melting-pot.") And the Phanariot influence was more deep rooted and 565
lasting in Rumania than in any other country in South- 641
Eastern Europe. In all these countries except Rumania it 661
was a transient phenomenon, it was a virus which thought it had inculcated its poison deep within the tissues of the native plant, yet nevertheless, owing to the inherent qualities of the latter, the scourge was tenaciously fought and was being slowly eliminated. But in Rumania, unfortunately, the bane went much deeper, for the Phanariots and their retainers had come in their thousands and settled in the country for good, and their numerous descendants form to-day the *élite* of the ruling classes of the old kingdom. The basic conception of the State held by the Phanariot was that it was the best and shortest avenue to personal advancement and enrichment. He applied and lived by the maxim of his Turkish patron of yore:

"Dovleten mali denŭz
Yemeyen onou domŭz,"

which may be translated by "the goods of the State are as vast as the sea, and he who does not help himself to them is
no better than a pig"

000 no better than a pig." If we take into consideration that
according to L. T. Hobhouse "the whole system of moral
tradition governing the life of a society is evolved from the
practical impulses and feelings at work in the past and
present," we may easily comprehend that the aspects of
social life as revealed by current events in Rumania, show a
natural process which could not be altered or deflected
except by titanic efforts of re-education. We have no right,
therefore, to blame the Rumanians for what we may consider
to be grave lapses, but which they prefer to interpret differently,
for after all, as A. R. Wallace affirms in his "Social
Environment and Moral Progress," "morality is not wholly
due to any inherent perception of right or wrong conduct,
but is to some extent a matter of convention varying with the
degree and kind of social development attained." And this
opinion is confirmed by L. T. Hobhouse, who, in his book
— "Morals in Evolution" states "the instinctive in human
morality is by no means an unfailing power implanted by
nature in all men to distinguish right from wrong."
461 Rumanian youth continues to cherish the traditional
575 Phanariot ambition of enriching itself through access to a
public post; other careers are neglected and looked askance
at. They are left to the more enterprising Jewish element,
which owing to its energy and capacity has taken complete
control of Rumanian trade and banking. Through the
neglect of the commercial professions, Rumanians have
hampered the formation of a middle class which, more than
any other element, is conducive to the creation of stability
647 and a vigilant public opinion. The public functionary class
465 is an unstable element, and as it enjoys no security of office
but depends for its tenure on the favours of politicians in
661 power, it naturally follows that it easily lends itself to corruption,
● and all the more so seeing that it is disgracefully underpaid.
In a lettter published by the "Argus" on 16th May,
1932, it was averred that the number of public functionaries
amounted to 500,000. (Including the staff employed by
municipalities). The number could easily be halved, and the
administration would stand to gain both in efficiency and
thoroughness by such a reduction. Greece, with a population
amounting to one-third that of Rumania, had a

total of only 43,943 functionaries (exclusive of those 647 employed by municipalities. Even this figure was considered 465 excessive, and a decree was enacted prohibiting 661 for a series of years the creation of fresh posts and the nomination of new functionaries to vacant posts in order that their number might be reduced. In Rumania such a measure is hardly likely to be enacted, for every politician must have the possibility of providing the more important of his electors with sinecures, for otherwise how would he induce them to vote for him? This is how the principle of public solidarity is understood and applied! Amongst us, state functionaries are considered as the servants of the public, in fact their function is revealed by the appellation under which they are designated; they are, in fact as well as in name, public servants. Rumanian functionaries are, one must admit, on the whole both courteous and obliging, especially to strangers, but such services as are rendered must be requited. Since the State barely remunerates them, it is obvious they have to secure their means of livelihood somewhere. Ot course no tariff is posted up in Government offices as to the amount of pecuniary compensation expected for the services demanded; *that* is a matter left to the discretion of the person soliciting the service, but a solatium of some sort has to be given to the functionary, as otherwise you will be made to feel the tediousness of waiting in a usually stuffy office. It is not surprising that such methods have gradually evinced probity from amongst the administrative personnel and made room for a venality which is occasionally exhibited so brazenly as to impel such an attentive observer as Mr Charles Wood to declare "there is nobody and nothing in Rumania who and which cannot be bought with money." (Contemporary Review, February, 1921.) Though the country teems with acts of maladministration there are yet many excellent, honest and plodding functionaries, who are all the more meritorious since they are neither properly remunerated nor encouraged for their loyal service to the State. This proves that if the Civil Service was placed beyond the withering influence of politics, stability of occupation guaranteed, and decent remuneration offered, a remedy for the ills which afflict Rumania would easily be devised. There

647 are certainly no insuperable obstacles to the removal of what
466 constitutes a drain on the strength and probity of the country,
661 which is being visibly weakened in every sphere of
administration.

The following article, which was published in the "Lupta" of Dec. 17th, 1931, is instructive as to the manner in which public functionaries behave in order to supplement the scanty salary they draw from the State and which generally does not suffice to keep them alive.

647 It is obvious that no civilized State would tolerate methods
651 which in Rumania are benevolently winked at. There is no
499 doubt that the evil could easily be remedied if functionaries
were decently paid. The increased outlay for the State
661 which this would involve would be largely compensated by a more conscientious performance of duty by the administrative staff. For instance, it is well known that owing to the high duties in force, smuggling on a colossal scale is being carried on with the connivance of officials, with the result that the State is defrauded of millions. M. V. Madgearu, former Minister of Finances, openly admits it in his book "Rumania's New Economic Policy," published in English, on page 39 of which we come across this astounding statement: "It has been shown that while pre-war Rumania imported about 70,000 kilos of natural silk, united Rumania registered the importation of only 1,000 kilos in 1927. It is well understood that the rest has been imported through smuggling." On a rough computation this item alone would account for an annual loss of some 50 million lei to the revenue.

But, apparently, blackmail is even more lucrative than smuggling, according to the article referred to in the "Lupta":—

647 "Truly, *smuggling* constitutes a source of big revenues for
651 the State. Not bona-fide smuggling which involves the
661 introduction of goods into the country without the disbursement of duties. This latter sort of smuggling is never discovered, or if discovered is rapidly hushed up with the connivance of the ablest pillars of the Ministry. The principal sources of revenue from smuggling are derived from the hypothetical variety, when for instance an anony-

mous letter of denunciation reaches the Ministry concerning 647
a commercial or industrial firm. This is immediately followed 651
by a close investigation of the firm's books. Though no 661
trace of contraband may have been found, yet rumours of high fines to be imposed on this firm get into circulation. Its owners make desperate efforts to dissipate them. The firm's bank announces that its overdraft will be suspended until the matter is cleared up. The merchant who cannot wait for a judicial examination of the charge brought against him, nor engage in protracted discussions with the Ministry, finding his credit at the bank has been suspended, endeavours to strike a bargain. He will offer 10%, occasionally even only 1% of the amount of the fine with which he has been threatened. The State pockets 80% of the sum thus offered and the zealous inspector who has "discovered" the reported contraband appropriates the remaining 20%. Why should these sums indeed be rejected? Such tactics, when employed by a clever functionary or inspector, will soon allow him to become the owner of palaces and buildings in the capital. Such is the just reward of labour!"

And in conclusion the "Lupta" advises the Ministry of Finance as to the measures it ought to take to prevent merchants from suffering unduly from the blackmailing activities of its financial inspectors!

That blackmailing and extortion are not unusual practices 647
may be inferred from the following announcement appearing
in a Bucarest daily on 15th March, 1929:—"The tribunal of 661
Cluj having received an endless number of complaints and 697
denunciations against Lieut.-Colonel Mihai, of the gendarmery, lately occupying the post of Police-Prefect at Cluj during the Liberal régime, has transmitted them to the judicial procurator. The investigations which are being pursued prove that the charges are well founded and that this Liberal terrorist had extorted moneys through blackmail from high class people while he was police prefect in the capital of Transylvania. Those who suffered most from the exercise of the functions of the accused (sic), were merchants, who, if they failed to deliver to the prefect the sums or goods demanded, were subjected to tortures and heavy fines and were threatened with the closing of their

647 shops and the confiscation of their goods." The most sensa-
697 tional administrative affair in Rumania was undoubtedly
that of the prison scandals of 1926, which gave rise to lively
661 press comments throughout the continent and thanks to
which the author of these scandals won widespread notoriety.

The following details concerning the methods in vogue in penitentiaries were given by the Bucarest "Socialismul" on May 16, 1926, on the occasion of the reported arrest of the notorious Cernat. . . . . "Directors and warders, seeking to grow rich rapidly, divide among themselves the moneys destined for the prisons. They appropriate both the food and the clothing set apart for those under arrest, they extort money from those better off, receive bribes in exchange for privileges, or force prisoners to work for them. The arrest of Major Cernat, who was appointed Director-General of Prisons while awaiting his appointment as Chief of the State Police Service, is no satisfaction for us. For we know that this man will be as well off in prison as at his home. We know further that in a few weeks or in a few months he will walk out free, with his head erect, for in our well-ordained country a big swindler has never been condemned or imprisoned, indeed it would be a crying injustice were such a thing to happen, since all our rulers have made their fortunes by similar dishonest practices."

697 The "Aurora" of June 3rd, 1926, reported the arrest of the directors of the penitentiaries of Doftana and Galatz, and gave details concerning the sums embezzled by these worthies. The system of imprisonment inaugurated by these clever rogues, however, deserves being enlarged upon as it is both amusing and illuminating. The following lucid and jocund report appeared in the French newspaper "Paris-Midi" on 17th June, 1926:—

"The Thousand and one joys of Rumanian Prisons."

"Bucarest. June 17th. Major Cernat, Director-General of Rumanian prisons, as well as the directors of several other penitentiary establishments, have been arrested. They are accused of failing to carry out their duties and of having shown too great indulgence towards the prisoners. Bucarest newspapers publish astounding details following on the

insatiable passion for the means wherewith they may be 000
secured.

Venomous rivalries are engendered and mortal envies 662
excited in the pursuit of such narrow and base aims. Antagonism between political men in Rumania is bitter and uncompromising because they are brought into mutual conflict by personal motives. They are always absorbed in their ambitions and grievances, and they reject all compromise, ready as they are to destroy if possible their opponents, for to them they naturally ascribe the same base motives by which they themselves are impelled. As they are seldom inspired by loyalty and devotion to any higher ideal they cannot recognize that their antagonists may pursue other than purely egoistic motives. Hence the intolerance and bitterness of the feuds among political factions.

In such an environment it is the unscrupulous and the 661
unprincipled who float to the top, and by a system of 515
alliances between big business and political bosses that smacks of American methods, the whole machinery of State is attuned to the express purpose of exploiting the masses for the benefit of the oligarchy at the head of affairs. No wonder that such methods check the vitality and the progress of any society within which they should happen unfortunately to appear, all the more so since there is a tendency to perpetuate themselves and become a permanent system.

Professor E. A. Ross, of Wisconsin, in his "Social 000
Psychology," says: "The men society allows to succeed and to be honoured are taken as models by the rising generation. It is in this that society receives its just punishment when it allows bad men to float to the top. Being imitated by the young, they spread their virus throughout the social body. Not the crook in the alley is the greater menace, but the crook in office."

Corruption has been instilled from above and it is hopeless to expect salvation from these upper strata of Rumanian society so far as the old kingdom is concerned. Transylvania, the cradle of the Rumanian people, which fortunately has not been contaminated by the Phanariot taint may perhaps prove the source from which eventually there may be regeneration from below by helping to reopen the sluices and

corner of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of 642
odious vampires, who have sucked everything dry and have 668
even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc.

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency 641
of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to per- 565
ceive the dominating personality who might control and 661
direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country :—"These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth."

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex- 565
Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, 641
who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof.

MISTAKES AND MUDDLES

● 661 The supreme mission of a Rumanian Government seems to consist in providing posts for its adherents and of furnishing means to its members and leading partisans of amassing fortunes. The psychology of such a governing clique is strangely akin to that of the predatory wolf-pack which is held together by the common pursuit of prey which is more easily secured by collective rather than by individual effort.

The mainspring of political activity seems to be the quest for the "odoriferous exhalation of the roast joint," *Mirosul Fripturei,* a sentence coined by Prof. Iorga whose integrity has had the effect of a centrifugal force on the main body of politicians. And it could hardly be otherwise since the Government plan of action is strictly adapted to conform to the necessity of satisfying the greed of its adherents before proceeding much farther. This constitutes a dire necessity, for if the appetites of the herd are not appeased the leaders run the risk of being repudiated and left in the lurch, the main body of their followers hastening to take up a more promising trail.

000 The maxim of "*primum vivere, deinde philosophari*" is observed in the letter. The experience of Prof. Iorga, one of the most honourable and respected figures of present day Rumania who had the temerity to invert the order of this popular dictum and exact of his followers a strict application of it in its reversed form, prevented him from ever forming a political following numerous enough to exert an influence on the political life of the country, and this in spite of his high and almost unique personal merits.

The following casual compilation of haphazard events, as reported at random in the Rumanian press, will enable the reader to form a general idea of the particularities of the political life of the country. No pains have been taken to prepare this selection except that of collecting reports of such piquant events whenever the writer had time to indulge in the reading of an odd Rumanian newspaper that might from time to time come into his possession. There is no doubt, however, that a somewhat prolonged sojourn in Rumania 000 might offer untold opportunities to the inquisitive for compiling volumes of records of intrigue and sharp practice. One indeed cannot but deplore the waste of so much intelligence, overreaching itself, and becoming cleverness, exhausting itself in mutual conflict, exercising itself anarchically without conscience or social motive to achieve in the end nothing but destruction and ruin. For this reason no surprise should be expressed at the repeated failures of all attempts to form a broad Coalition Government which might have extricated Rumania out of the financial quagmire in which she is wallowing. To secure this goal it would have been necessary to supply the unifying purpose of an elevated ideal, but instead of this only sordid and base aims such as provoke lamentable and fatal division have so far been available, and out of such poor material, an imposing edifice of unity and harmony can never be constructed.

The paternal solicitude of the Averescu Government for the endowment of its supporters. 661

According to the "Cuvantul" of June 17th, 1927, Goga, the Minister of the Interior decided to take a census in Transylvania. He entrusted this task to his brother who was also a deputy, assigning to him 28 million lei. As this operation consisted merely of printing forms, public agents being instructed to distribute them, the newspaper finds that M. Goga may well merit inclusion in the list of "honourable" men. We read in the "Cuvantul" of 15th August, 1927:

"*Like master, like man.*"

"The disciplinary commission of the State Railways had ordered at its workshops a sumptuous writing desk. During an inspection, General Jonescu, who then occupied the post of Under-Secretary of State for the Railways, was seen using this desk. To-day this desk is to be found in the General's house, and has been placed in his dining room.

Since General Averescu departed from the Presidency of the Council, taking with him the furniture, why should not General Ionescu follow the example set by his chief?"

The Bucarest press was rather hard on General Averescu, and failed to discern the true motives behind this somewhat singular act. The General was so attached to his duties that he felt most keenly his dismissal, all the more so since it came so unexpectedly. In order to assuage his feelings he must have thought that it was best to indulge in the illusion that he was still at the head of the Government. To carry out such an idea it was necessary to furnish one of his rooms in the same style as his office at the Ministry. Whence, probably the decision to transfer the furniture from the latter place to his home. The correctness of this interpretation cannot of course be vouched for, but it will be admitted that it is more generous than that offered by the Rumanian press at the time. The latter, too, showed itself particularly unpleasant towards another colleague of the General, dubbing him "Vacuum cleaner" because he managed to dispose, prior to his withdrawal from his ministerial post, of the total annual credits allocated to his department, although several months had still to elapse before the completion of the year. His successor in office, finding that the funds allotted to his department had been completely expended, had to ask for the provision of a supplementary credit of several million lei in order to meet current expenditure which had already been voted and the requisite funds supplied by the Treasury.

"A new scandalous affair at the Ministry of Public Instruction." The wife of General Averescu secures the exclusive right . . . of supplying the workshops of the professional schools with materials.

The "Cuvantul" of Sept. 27th, 1926, published an article with the above title in large type and protested against the manifest favouritism which such decisions entail and the flagrant violations of the law which they imply.

"The Pica Affair" and the Ministry of Public Instruction.

"From one affair to another."

The "Cuvantul" of 3rd Oct., 1926, published two articles with the above titles and protested against the decision of the Ministry to compel school children to buy their clothes exclusively at the shop "Pica." It relates that the price asked for a mantle and a hat is as high as 1,650 and 500 lei respectively, whilst in other shops both these articles may be obtained easily for 1,000 lei. The "Cuvantul" is naturally indignant that the Ministry should permit school children to be so shamefully exploited.

In the second article the paper narrates how pupils have been ordered to obtain their school uniforms at a particular tailor's shop in Bucarest and protests against the creation of such monopolies for the benefit of a few individuals and to the detriment of the public interest.

In its issue of Oct. 8th, 1926, the "Cuvantul" publishes an open letter to the Minister of Public Instruction, ironically greets him on his arrival from Carlsbad, and demands his immediate attention to twelve different "affairs" which it enumerates in turn. The paper concludes in the following style: "Shall we continue farther? it has sufficed for you to absent yourself for a month in order that your ministry should become a daily purveyor to the press of abuses and scandals. You have done well to come at last. We are awaiting you. We wish you to get to work, . . .with the broom and the birch." . . .

In the same issue the "Cuvantul" publishes a lengthy article on another affair characterized as a "Panama of tens of millions of lei." An individual enjoying political protection had secured the right to supply all schools with icons at the modest price of 600 lei each, plus 25 lei for transport charges. Every single schoolroom had to be furnished with one. The paper ends up by declaring ironically "this holy icon intended to maintain the sacred fire of faith and morality should also have been placed in all barracks, hospitals, and tribunals, for people gather together in such buildings, and the moral and religious education of these people might be improved by the sight of this same icon."

The Army Supplies Scandal.

During the Chamber's session on 15th March, 1926, M. Virgil Madgearu attacked the Liberal Government for supplying the army with aeroplanes which were unfit for service, and qualified this act as criminal. He stated that the guilty party sat on the Ministerial bench, that a com-

661 mission of 30 million lei had been pocketed, amounting to 25% of the total amount of the order. This had been confirmed by the Royal Commissary, while General Henţescu had asserted that there were no orders placed without commissions being received. The Minister of War, General Mardarescu, was directly involved in this affair and he should be made to accept full responsibility. The latter's defence was exceedingly lame. The "Cuvantul" of 7th July, 1927, relates how it had been decided to repair the defective motors of the aeroplanes. After remaining for two years at Bucarest they were shipped to France, where on examination they were found to have deteriorated to such an extent that they were useless. They were nevertheless superficially repaired and shipped back, at a total cost to the State of twelve million lei, wasted money as the paper declares. In its issue of 28th Sept., 1927, the same paper, commenting on the mortal accidents which recently befell Rumanian aviators, vehemently condemns the Liberals for supplying the army with such worthless planes, and accuses the ministers of being actuated solely by the desire to pocket commissions and of showing no consideration for the human lives that are imperilled. The order for these aeroplanes had been placed by the Ministry in spite of the advice of the Technical Committee.

During the year 1929, the press enlarged on the contract for the supply of sanitary material, amounting to 400 truckloads. Many irregularities were pointed out, and the question came to be referred to as the "syringe affair." Such grave derelictions of duty on the part of those in authority have resulted in the army being placed in a state [70] of utter unpreparedness, as was revealed by a speech of the Minister of War, General Mircescu, delivered in the Chamber on September, 1927, and in the course of which he was reported to have said: "We have no aeroplanes, no rifles, no machine guns; neither poisonous gases, nor gas masks; we have no artillery, we have no tanks; we have no navy, even sufficient for our defence. No seaplanes. We have not enough non-commissioned officers; our reserves are not trained; we have no horses, no equipment, no medicinal supplies. We just have enough troops to marshal at parades when foreigners are received, and to maintain internal 661 order."

The Reşiţa Affair.

The Reşiţa is the largest metallurgical establishment of 661 Rumania, and being in close proximity to the iron and coal 327 mines of the Banat, is susceptible of rapid development. Its shares, which fetched 809 lei in 1929, have dropped to 402 in 1930, 205 in June, 1931, and 130 lei in 1932. The " Epoca " of 24th Oct., 1930, reported the following details on the management which may partially explain this depreciation, but at any rate they serve to show on what principles limited companies are generally run in Rumania :-

"We published during May details as to the amount of directors' remuneration distributed. This amounted to 83 million lei, while 86 millions were distributed among the shareholders. The director, Prince Barbu Stirbey, received over 10 millions annually. In other countries such particulars would have created consternation. With us nothing happened, because Stirbey's dictature is all-powerful. To-day the Reşiţa is at the mercy of the Credit Anstallt, of Vienna, owing to the manner the Company was administered, the interest of the shareholders being always the last consideration. Secret conventions were signed by Prince Stirbey who drew tens of millions of lei annually for travelling expenses. The ordinary revenue was insufficient to face such wastefulness, even with the 200% subsidy furnished by the State, and therefore recourse to loans from the Credit Anstallt was necessary, the Reşiţa being on the threshold of bankruptcy. The great Viennese bank has put a stop to the scandalous remuneration received by Stirbey and has increasingly taken control of the Company."

Prince Stirbey was one of the leading pillars of the Liberal 661 party and took a prominent part in exiling the (then) Crown Prince Carol from the country. The Reşiţa seems to be associated with scandal. In 1921 it was disclosed that some eighty deputies and senators had received shares in the concern in order to support interests inimical to the Rumanian State, and these disclosures provoked at the time tumultuous debates in the Chamber.

RUMANIA

661 *The Exploitation of the Forest of Bucovina.*

The "Cuvantul" of the 3rd–8th Oct., 1926, in a series of articles, enlarges on a contract passed for the exploitation of the forests of Bucovina on the basis of a fictitious price which would cause an approximate loss of 120 million lei to the State domains. After exposing in detail this shady affair, the author, a deputy named Florescu, asks whether in view of the enormous prejudice caused to the State such a contract should be upheld, as it was concluded in violation of the law and of all principles of honour.

Frauds in the Banat and the Maramureş.

In the above-mentioned numbers of the "Cuvantul" one meets the story of how 280 truckloads of maize, destined for the relief of the famine-stricken population of the Maramureş Province, were disposed of for the benefit of some big party bosses. . . "Of the 280 trucks, 120 were distributed, but only after the maize had become unfit for use; as for the remaining 160 trucks, no one knows where they have gone. But people whisper that three big rats have eaten them up and their names are well known." Another article is devoted to the fraudulent activities of a personage who, after embezzling moneys and engaging in contraband, was, instead of being thrown into prison, nominated by politicians to the post of Prefect of Temişoara. Yet another case of a corrupt and inefficient, but officially shielded functionary !

Irregularities in the Bucarest Municipality.

The "Cuvantul" in December, 1926, published a series of articles giving full details of a mass of important frauds committed to the detriment of the public, and it appealed to the Minister of the Interior to put a stop to the scandals.

The Activities of certain Directors of the National Bank of Rumania.

The "Cuvantul" of 8th Dec., 1926, published a leader on M. Oromolu, appointed to the post of Director of the National Bank through political intervention, and who by extending his protection to a dishonest individual permitted the latter to commit numerous frauds. The National Bank was finally involved to the tune of 40 million lei, and the "Cuvantul" vents its wrath on M. Oromolu. In its issue of 10th November, 1926, the same paper relates how another director, Ghiorghiu, took under his protection the brothers Berkovitz, who had a bank at Bucarest and who committed various frauds and engaged in contraband. Whenever they were found out, politicians intervened to hush up the matter, but finally, owing to the "Cuvantul's" campaign, the financial inspectors succeeded in proving that these sharpers kept two sets of books, one for themselves and one intended for the inspection of the financial authorities, in order to avoid paying too much in taxation.

The Failure of the Bank Cetatea of Braşov.

The "Cuvantul" of 17 June, 1931, expatiates upon the activities of this bank and its association with prominent members of the National Peasant Party, who however are in no way implicated in the disaster. The bank, in order to extricate itself from its difficult position, spent more than 13 million lei in developing a stone quarry for the purpose of providing the material for the refection of the whole system of roads of the State. Political influences were brought to bear, but the onerous contract for the construction of these State roads was rejected by the Chamber, in spite of the fact that the National Peasant Party had a large majority in it. Thus one may come now to understand why the much-talked of Stewart contract concerning the roads was concluded; the tension that existed between the National Peasant Party and the Director of the National Bank, M. D. Burillianu, is likewise explained. The latter refused to come to the aid of the Cetatea bank as the institution was too deeply involved and could not be saved. This is yet another example of the nefarious results arising from alliances between business and politics.

The Complaints of State Pensioners.

The "Adeverul" of 28th Jan., 1932, reports the proceedings of the congress of pensioners. The budget provided for a reduction of 390 million lei on the total amount of pensions

661 to be paid during the year. Nevertheless the Ministerial Council had decreed that the amount payable should be reduced by yet another 110 millions. This was considered unfair, all the more so since the critical condition of the pension fund is due to the fact that a mass of politicians having no right whatever to pensions have been awarded very generous ones, while men who had devoted their whole life to the service of the State ran the risk of dying of hunger.

The Bank of Industrial Credit.

652 The "Cuvantul" of 11th March, 1929, published an article revealing the unsound character of the expedients which are occasionally resorted to in order to secure temporary alleviation for the Treasury, and some of the results of this policy.

"The management of the public finances was so irregular during these three last years that the State was obliged to conclude a foreign loan in order to pay its debts to local contractors. This was not only a period of financial insincerity, but also one in which the conception of honestly meeting one's pecuniary obligations was undermined. The bad example of the State proved contagious to commerce in general. The "Industrial Credit" was created to enable the National Bank to obtain relief from a mass of bills that found their way to it to be rediscounted at a time when the State had obtained the maximum amount of credit from local industry, and when the latter was no longer in a position to pay the excessive interest on State debts which the banks insisted on charging when discounting the said debts. The irregular payment of State debts created other inconveniences. Local industries, to protect themselves from being ruined, were obliged to increase the price of the articles supplied. The cost of materials furnished to the State was thereby very sensibly increased. To prevent foreign industrialists from under-selling local producers, who were thus forced to sell their products at inflated prices, it became necessary to impose excessive protective duties, the burden of which fell ultimately on the inarticulate masses."

MISTAKES AND MUDDLES

The Congress of Egg Exporting Firms.

Astounding details of the corruption prevalent in Rumania were disclosed at this congress held at Bucarest in 1931, to discuss the standardization of eggs, a measure imposed by the Government. No export permits were obtainable without the payment of bribes. The names of several officials who extorted sums from the egg exporting firms were mentioned, and the delegates of the latter did nothing but criticize this Government measure which resulted in a falling off in egg exports by 50 %. One of the delegates ironically declared that the only advantage secured was the standardization of bribes !

Frauds Committed by Oil Firms.

The "Cuvantul" of 14th May, 1932, relates how the State had been defrauded of several milliard lei during the last few years. Invoices of all oil exported had to be stamped with revenue stamps amounting to 1.32% of the value declared on the invoices. In 1922 it was decreed that the sums represented by these stamps should be paid direct to the State. Recent investigations showed that there had been a systematic evasion of this impost by almost all oil exporting companies since 1922, and that they would now be fined. Though the State could not recover the sums of which it had been defrauded during the years 1922–1927 (owing to the time limit for claims having elapsed) yet after 1927 the sums involved could be recovered, and these would certainly amount to several milliards of lei.

Other Frauds and Scandals.

The "Cuvantul" of May 16th, 1932, gives sensational details concerning the arrest of a Chief Constable who carried on simultaneously with his official profession the more lucrative one of a ringleader of a band of housebreakers and pickpockets.

In another article it reveals extensive frauds which are taking place at the Bucarest Municipality in the town-planning department, etc. While yet in another column it enlarges on the discovery of a fraud of 12 million lei perpetrated by certain functionaries in the tax-collecting department of Constantsa.

655 maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

● 661 471 186 Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

433 454 It is sad to record that during the years when there was a plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest prevalent. 426 437 454 Commercial bills were discounted at rates varying between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

651 As a result the revenue from Customs, which formed one of the basic sources of revenue for the State, has gradually ceased to function as such. Revenue from this head gradually declined from 9,243 million lei in 1927 to 2,516 million lei in 1931, though this decrease is also attributable to other causes, such as the lowering or elimination of export taxes.

651 Probably one of the most acrimonious criticisms that ever
661 appeared in the Press concerning the excessive Protectionism obtaining in Rumania was published in the *Cuvantul* for March 3rd, 1931, and the following quotation from it is worth retaining as it casts a lurid light on the inner machinery of government:

"A Rumanian State, in the true and proper meaning of the word, is non-existent. For the essential functions of this State have been usurped by certain gangs whose main preoccupation is to furnish their members with money wrested from the taxpayer. The national revenue is annually amputated of an exorbitant portion in the form of taxes, with which the State does no good. The State administration functions from bad to worse while hordes of politicians wax fat on the public treasury. The State administration has been annexed by the party bosses and the public budget has been confiscated for the benefit of the clients of these parties. And when the resources of the State revenues have no longer sufficed for these highwaymen, other means have been devised in order to rob the citizens and provide for the upkeep of these harpies. A scandalous legislation, characterized by a Protectionism without parallel in Europe, and aiming at the protection of a parasitic industry, was voted for the benefit of profiteers, who are intimately interested in all the pecuniary calculations of the politicians. Under the aegis of this Protectionism the most rapacious trusts flourish to-day in Rumania and exploit the consumer. Instead of aiding agriculture, the latter has been dislocated and ruined by the extreme favours lavished on this artificial industry, and all this for the sole purpose of satisfying the exorbitant pretensions of the industrial bandits, who have known how to turn governments and parliaments into docile instruments for fleecing the consumer. . . ."

That the extreme Protectionism adopted by Rumania is

+ That the extreme Protectionism adopted, Rumania is

not approved by the public may also be seen from the following excerpts culled from an article published by the same paper on May 15th, 1932: "There is a profound difference between industries which utilize local raw materials and such pseudo-industries which import from abroad semi-manufactured materials and finish them off in this country. . . . The importation of semi-manufactured goods is in the great majority of cases carried on solely to evade the Customs tariffs, and if we do not see things as they are, this is on account of private interests, for the sake of which we allow a prejudicial system to continue to function. . . ." 651 661 431

The *Argus*, too, several times attempted to call public attention to the nefarious results of the policy of bolstering up artificial industries, and especially in the case of the textile industry, on which it wrote as follows: "Why are clothing materials so costly? Because our protected textile industry sells its products at the same price as the goods imported from abroad. The encouragement given to the textile industry has resulted in increasing the cost of wearing apparel because industrialists are not content with a reasonable profit, and as a result a woollen suit to-day is a luxury. When our Custom tariff is to be revised the interests of industrialists alone should not be considered, but also those of the consumers."

As one may infer from the above, this policy of industrialization was a wild scheme which materialized on a large scale, chiefly because various politicians had been directly interested in the manufacturing concerns which had been started. 661 [657] 289 477

The case of the paper industry may be cited as an example. All the paper mills belonged to or were controlled by friends or relatives of the Bratianus. In order to secure big profits an import duty of 50 per cent was placed on paper, creating thereby a virtual monopoly of the paper trade on behalf of the owners of the mills. As they could dictate their will to the Chamber, the high duty was maintained in spite of the protest of the Opposition. For not only the public at large suffered by the high price of such an essential commodity as paper, but political interests were equally affected. Opposition parties had to pay high prices

661 for the paper necessary for their pamphlets and newspapers,
477 while the Bratianus' Press organs naturally enjoyed pre-
[289] ferential rates. Another deplorable result of this monopoly was the high cost of books. The same book published in
[212] Bulgaria cost about half as much as in Rumania, and this explains to some extent the high percentage of illiterates in the latter country, which according to the *Lupta* of May 18th, 1932 reached as high a percentage as 70 per cent of the
423 total population. The creation of industries, the raw material of which is not indigenous, is likely in the long run to prove extremely wasteful. They are clearly of a parasitic nature, and their maintenance will not only continue to be a charge on the Revenue but is likely to continue to handicap very seriously Rumania's staple industry, agriculture. The initial costs of installation are necessarily high, for foreign experts have to be called in to set up the machinery, supervise, and train the native workpeople, since there is a lack of experienced workmen. Moreover the stringency of monetary resources and the high rates of interest ruling necessitate a high return on capital that can be secured only by selling the manufactured article at the highest possible price, a level which is usually fixed by the cost of the corresponding foreign article, on which a heavy duty has been imposed. The high prices will forcibly curtail output since the latter is adjusted to the capacity of the local market, the possibilities of which are restrained owing to the low buying power of the peasantry. The more consumption is reduced the more manufacturers will endeavour to recoup themselves by further raising their prices, which can be attained only by increasing the protective duty. Thus a vicious circle is created, to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, who
[162] constitute 80 per cent of the population and who have to defray in the same proportion the expenses of these experimental attempts to industrialize Rumania. It is obvious that the high prices paid by the peasantry for manufactured articles affect adversely the cost of agricultural produce; even the transport rates of the latter stand high in order to compensate for the low preferential rates granted to local manufactures. One need not, therefore, be surprised if Rumanian agriculturalists can no longer market their pro-

AGRICULTURE

As a result of the legislative measures enacted in 1917 and 423
1921 Rumania, which was a country of vast latifundia, was transformed into one of smallholdings. Fear, rather than generosity or a desire to promote the country's welfare, prompted the initiation of these enactments. The Russian example which was nigh would have proved contagious had a policy of repression been adopted similar to that of 1907, when over 11,000 Rumanian peasants were ruthlessly massacred in their vain attempt to secure more humane treatment at the hands of their landlords. The landed classes had therefore to yield much in order to retain at least a little. Besides, the initiative had already been taken by Bessarabia, prior to her final declaration of union with Rumania in 1918, of enacting the expropriation of the large estates, and Rumania was confronted with the dilemma of following suit or of seeing Bessarabia demand the annulment of the act of union just passed, for it was impossible for the latter to rescind this measure.

That no high motives were behind this policy of expropriation may be inferred from the perfunctory manner in which it was applied, and the absence of a rational plan for putting it into operation. In fact, one of the reasons for the sudden dismissal of the first Vaida-Voevod administration in 1920 was apprehension lest Mihalache, the then Minister of Agriculture, would have seen to the thorough and rational execution of the expropriation decrees. It could have been easily foreseen that the peasantry, who until then had been in a state akin to serfdom, were destitute and had not the capital wherewith to exploit the lands that were being allotted them. It was the imperative duty of the State to find the means necessary to endow the peasantry with the indispensable agricultural equipment for the cultivation of their lands. The Governments presided over by the Bratianus, however, were busy reserving the exploitation of the natural resources of the country for their partisans, and the peasants were
left to fend for themselves as best they could. The Bratianus 661
would suffer no harm from the fact that the State was 423

neglecting the peasants; on the contrary, they saw in them a 661 numerous and profitable crowd of clients for the banks, the 423 majority of which were under their control. The less pecuniary aid the peasant obtained from the State, the greater would be his need of the private bank or usurer. And so well did the latter entangle the peasants in their tentacles that within ten years of the enactment of the Land Distribution Act the debts contracted by the peasants had surpassed the value of their lands. Thus the much-belauded agrarian revolution in Rumania was threatened with complete failure, and so another revolutionary measure had to be passed, the strangely-termed "law for the sanitation of agrarian debts," in order to save the peasantry from being dispossessed of their land.

311 241 434 The *Argus* of 13th February, 1932, published the following table which shows how the land was actually distributed:

Area of properties.		Total hectares.	Percentage of area.	Number of proprietors.	Percentage of total. Owners.	Average area of farm for each category.
Up to 5 hectares	...	6,280,993	43.60	3,731,403	84.20	1.94
5 to 10 hectares	...	2,919,863	20.20	435,715	11,30	6.70
10 to 50 hectares	...	2,392,689	16.60	148,860	3.90	16.07
50 to 250 hectares	...	1,505,257	10.40	18,122	0.50	83.06
Over 250 hectares	...	1,305,670	9.10	2,597	0.10	502.00
Total	...	14,404,462,	100.00	3,836,757	100.00	[illegible].75

As one hectare sown to wheat yields approximately 1,200 kg. of wheat, and the average price of wheat during 1931 was about 2.25 lei, the revenue per hectare may be reckoned at about 2,700 lei. As the average holding of 84 per cent of the peasantry is about 2 hectares, the paper assumed that the revenue of each peasant household amounted approximately to some 5,400 lei, or about 160 gold francs. For the 241 year 1931 the total revenue from agriculture was computed 434 at 46,500 million lei, of which 21 milliards were derived from the cattle-rearing industry, 21 milliards from cereals, and 4½ milliards from other plants. Other crops were even less profitable; thus the average price of maize was 1.50 lei per kg. and the yield 1,500 kg. per hectare, so that the revenue per hectare amounted to 2,250 lei, and the figures for barley were respectively 2 lei, 1,400 kg., and 2,800 lei.

496 and the unification of the whole system can only be realized by the construction of connecting lines between what so far has been three distinct systems. The laying of double tracks on trunk lines is also imperatively needed in certain sections, such as that of Constantsa-Feteşti. Several offers by foreign groups were made for the reorganization of the railways, but the Rumanian Government would not agree to the stipulations set forth by foreign capitalists, namely, that they should exercise control over the expenditure and that they should be guaranteed repayment. It is indeed strange that financiers should be expected to advance funds without adequate security, especially to an administration which has been characterized by disorder and waste, and that to an extent surpassing what is customary even in Rumania. The methods employed in running the railway system are generally indicative of the chaotic manner in which the whole machinery of government is being run, and will serve to show that there is little hope for real improvement so long as there is no outside control.

496
661 The whole railway system had been endowed with an autonomous administration in 1925 by the Bratianu Government, but, as was to be expected, the chief purpose of the initiators of this measure was to create as many "cushy jobs" for the veterans of the party as possible, so that instead of a simplification and co-ordination there ensued a complication bordering on chaos. The disorder rendered control difficult, or well nigh impossible, and has facilitated fraud to an unprecedented extent. No year has passed without discoveries being made of sensational embezzlements perpetrated to the detriment of the railway administration, through which the latter was despoiled of important sums. Even as late as March, 1932, the Press was publishing details of a fresh scandal through which the State railways had been defrauded of several millions. The *Cuvantul* of May 15th, 1932, related that the chief cashier of the railways at Brasov had embezzled over a million lei. On September 7th, 1927, the *Argus* published an article by a former Minister of Communications in which the latter stated that "he estimated the loss suffered by the railways through lack of control to be about 25 per cent of their gross revenue," and he referred

to methods of fraud applied on a wholesale scale at Galatz by which the railways had been systematically defrauded. For instance, whole truckloads of timber forwarded from Bucovina and destined for Giurgiu, on their arrival at Galatz were fraudulently diverted to another destination, so that the consignee at Giurgiu had to be indemnified by the railway administration for the loss of his goods. In another article, published two days later, the writer enlarged on the lack of co-ordination among the different departments of this administration and the total absence of reliable data on which to form an estimate of the situation, a state of affairs that was positively chaotic. As an illustration of this he cited the fact "that while the Under-Secretary of State affirmed that the year 1926 showed a deficit of one milliard and a half lei, the General Manager of the Railways averred on the contrary that there was a surplus of 200 millions"!

Another paper, the *Cuvantul*, which had undertaken a vigorous campaign against the disgraceful disorder prevailing on the railways, referred in its issue of July 24th, 1927, to the following statement of the Under-Secretary of State for Communications: "It is enough to say that according to the accounts there ought to be one milliard and a half of cash, but instead I am 500 millions in debt. This situation is due to the fact that the profit and loss accounts of preceding years have not yet been closed." The *Cuvantul* proceeded to compliment the Under-Secretary for his outspokenness and to condemn M. V. Bratianu for having deliberately misled the public by affirming that the working of the railways was quite normal and that it had been carried on at a profit for the State. Both the *Argus* and the *Cuvantul* continued to publish articles emphasizing the necessity of foreign loans being obtained so that the railway system might be properly reorganized, and laying stress on the disastrous consequences for the country arising from the actual disorganization. According to these articles, the lines were in complete decay and were almost useless. "The rails of one-fourth of the track were so worn out that it was a miracle that trains could run on them. The number of rotten sleepers exceeded imagination. There were three times less locomotives than the normal average, and the railway junctions were

496 661 continually blocked up. . . ." On October 27th, 1927, the *Cuvantul* related how extensive frauds were found to have been committed by higher railway officials in Transylvania, and that the affair was being hushed up so that these persons might not be incriminated.

On March 3rd, 1928, the same paper enlarged on the collapse of the railway bridge over the Milcov, near Focşani, the construction of which had been entrusted to a favourite of M. V. Bratianu who, so far, instead of being punished, had been appointed to another post. The *Argus* of February 20th, 1929, in an article entitled "What has been done with the Railways?" cites the following facts: "It was decided to illuminate the railway cars with methane gas, and lamps and instruments were bought for this purpose. All these remain unused in the warehouses because it has since been found out that methane gas could not be used for such a purpose. . . . Lathes of a value of 40 millions were ordered; this is a quantity likely to suffice for a period of ten to fifteen years. . . . There are some 280 trucks loaded with corrugated iron. As the annual requirements of the railway administration are about two to three truckloads, this stock is likely to last a century. . . ."

497 661 With the advent of the National Peasant Party to power a slight improvement set in, but it was too much to expect that a system which had become traditional could be altered in the course of a few years. The *Cuvantul* of March 31st, 1929, commenting on the resignation of the general manager of the railways, declared that this was a good beginning. "So far our railways were not an institution for furthering travel and facilitating transport, but a counting-house for the sale, at exorbitant prices, of all kinds of manufactures of the various industrial firms associated with the Liberal Party. . . ." In previous articles the *Cuvantul* had described how the railway administration, being under the control of partisans of the Liberal Party, the latter had done everything in its power to promote the interests of members of that party to the detriment of those of the State. The carelessness and remissness of the railway administration may be gauged by the fact that it positively discouraged traffic on its own lines, and diverted it to foreign countries

by a policy of high rates. Thus in January, 1927, the *Argus* 497
complained that timber exports from Bucovina, instead of 661
being forwarded for shipment via Galatz, were being diverted to Dantzig because (owing to the new rates) the cost of transport for one truckload of timber to the first port amounted to 9,500 lei, while the freightage to the second port cost only 4,400 lei. In another article the complaints of the Transylvanian industrialists were aired, and these likewise complained that owing to high rates and lack of trucks they were losing their foreign trade. It was affirmed that only one-fifth of the number of trucks necessary for Transylvania had been allotted to that region, and that the shortage was made more acutely felt owing to the manifest favouritism attending the allocation of trucks. Moreover, trucks which had been slightly injured were not repaired promptly but shunted on to sidings, where they were left to rot and fall to pieces.

The neglect with which the traffic requirements of Transylvania were treated led industrialists of that region to the conclusion that this was a deliberate policy so that their rivals in the old kingdom might be protected from the influx of goods from Transylvania. (*Argus*, November 27th, 1926.)

A policy of excessive transport rates has been applied, 497
which has wrought incredible harm to the railways by reducing traffic and fostering the development of motor road transport, which is rapidly increasing. The latter is proving a formidable rival to the railways, and competition has become so keen that the railway administration has thought of making use of motor railcars on some lines in order to provide increased services and attract some of the traffic it has lost back again, but though this scheme was mooted several years ago it was only recently that an order for a few steam railcars was given to a Birmingham firm.

In fact the railway administration has since 1927 shown a loss every year. Thus 1927 showed a deficit of 1,278,395,915 lei, 1928 of 1,625,634,902, 1929 of 981,635,257, 1930 of 1,286,001,744, while for 1931, according to the *Adeverul* of January 28th, 1932, it was reported that the deficit would be the largest so far recorded, for while expenditure had re-

in the *Argus* of 14th May, 1932, and statistics were quoted 497
to show that since 1927 freight rates had increased by 112.5 per cent, and these charges, which were estimated in 1929 to represent 5.2 per cent of the value of the goods handled, represented in 1931 as high a percentage as 10.2. Owing to the high transport charges there was a serious falling off in traffic; thus while 18,191,860 tons had been carried in 1930, there were only 16,403,536 tons handled in 1931. The *Argus* of 24th and 25th January, 1932 affirmed that railway charges on grain exported averaged 20 per cent of its value, while the cost of carrying timber often reached 40 per cent of its value.

A further reason why the railway administration cannot 497
even cover its expenses is the high price which it has had to 661
pay for its coal. So far it seems to have been under the tutelage and grip of the "Liberal" Party, the partisans of which forced it to buy the bulk of its coal at exorbitant prices from mines which belonged to them. Thus the *Cuvantul* of December 29th, 1928, affirmed that these "Liberal" companies received annually some two milliard lei for supplying coals at the extravagant price of 1,643 lei per ton. The *Lupta*, in an article published on May 14th or 15th, 1932, asserted that while in Rumania expenditure on fuel amounts to 14½ per cent of the total expenses of the railways, Germany expended only 6 per cent on this head, Poland 8 per cent, and Italy, a country totally deprived of coal, spends only 9½ per cent. The paper also complained that expenditure for the upkeep of rolling stock was inordinately high, amounting to 30.6 per cent. in Rumania, as against 12.7 per cent in Germany, 14.7 per cent in Austria, and 17.7 per cent in Poland.

The *Argus* of 24th April, 1932, relates how political influences are being exerted to bring pressure to bear on the railway administration so that it should place orders for a supply of lignite from mines in the valley of the Jiu, at a cost of some 100 millions per annum. This fuel was shown to be useless, and had to be burned mixed up with crude oil in the locomotives. Its purchase constitutes a downright waste, "but when repeated and weighty interventions are resorted

497 to we understand why the railway administration has not
661 yet excluded lignite from among the fuels of which it makes use. . . ." A close examination of the items of the expenditure would probably reveal undue liberality under certain heads. Thus the total expenditure for 1930 amounted to 12,577,602,209 lei, of which 2,700 millions were devoted to the upkeep and repair of rolling stock, 746 millions to the upkeep of the lines, 1,830 millions to fuel, 6,743 millions to salaries, wages, etc.

496 Out of the proceeds of the 1929 loan, some 4,751 million lei were earmarked for the reconditioning of the railways. The sum was to be employed for the renewal of the tracks, the purchase of rolling stock, the construction of new lines, and for the improvement and enlargement of workshops. Expenditure on this last item was exceedingly ill-advised, for the railway administration had entered into engagements with certain foreign firms, on the strength of which the latter had built repair-shops, such as the "Astra" Company at Arad, the "Lemaître" workshops at Reşiţa, and the Franco-Romana Co. at Braila. In 1929 there still remained four outstanding contracts expiring in 1935, and guaranteeing a yearly expenditure of 640 millions for constructing locomotives, and two other contracts expiring in 1939 which provided for the repairing of locomotives, of a value of 335 millions. As soon as the railway administration was able to use its new workshops it proceeded to disregard these contracts, and as a result these private firms had to close down and dismiss their workmen. The *Argus* of 11th May, 1932 denounces the railway administration for its indefensible attitude in the following terms:

"These industries have suffered immense losses. Their staff had to be dismissed, and they have been rendered incapable of meeting their engagements. All of them will put in claims for damages, and we can hardly doubt that Justice, taking into consideration the contracts made with the railways, will be found to pronounce in their favour. Who is to pay the damages? Naturally the State, which is also going to lose the taxes which it would have raised on the contracts had they been carried out. But the greatest loss consists in

the loss of confidence which this stupid policy of disregarding 496
legal engagements entails for the State and its administrations."

The *Dreptatea* of May 19th, 1932, gives an example of the 496
prevailing favouritism in the granting of contracts by the 661
railway administration. Thus tenders were invited for the renovation of the signalling apparatus on the line Fetești-Cernavoda in August, 1931, but as the administration desired to favour a certain firm no contract was passed, but finally the order was placed with this particular firm at a price of eleven million lei when other firms had undertaken to do the work for only six and a half millions. Naturally the *Dreptatea* takes the Director-General, M. Ionescu, to task for his attitude, and declares that no one should wonder if the railway administration runs into deficits every year. An additional cause for the losses incurred is the overstaffing of the administration, and especially the numerous sinecures that have been created for the benefit of persons enjoying official protection. A few years ago it was impossible to find out how the administration was being run, for no proper balance sheets had been drawn up for years. Fortunately, a British expert has been invited to supervise the accounts, so that data are now available up to date. But this is obviously an inadequate measure, and the railways will become a paying concern capable of responding to the necessities of the country only when and if they are placed under foreign control, or under the management of some capable and honest Rumanian effectively shielded by foreign influence from all interference by political circles. . . . The slovenly methods so far employed in the railway administration have hampered not only the internal development of the country but have also prevented it from increasing its revenues from traffic transit across Rumania; for the country controls two big trade routes, namely that from Poland and the Baltic States towards the Black Sea and the Near East, which used to be one of the great trade routes of old, and that from Central Europe through Transylvania to Constantsa.

There are two alternatives to the latter, namely the 496
Danube and that through Yugoslavia, so that if the Rumanian 505
railways were properly managed they could easily

RUMANIA

491 A contract was recently signed with a Swedish firm for the 64 laying of 570 kms. of permanent and 180 kms. of semi-permanent roads by the end of 1936, but this is far from satisfying even the most urgent requirements of the country. As matters stand now there is some probability that the contract will be cancelled, for it was found out that during the winter of 1931 the roads which so far had been constructed had undergone serious deterioration through the frost. In the discussion which ensued in the Chamber the Minister of Communications accused his predecessor in office of having been bribed, and in support of this charge he adduced the fact that, while the Government delegate who was despatched to Paris to sign the contract with the company had been instructed to accept as maximum prices 618 lei per square metre for the permanent roads, and 330 lei per square metre for the semi-permanent, he exceeded his instructions and signed the contract on the basis of 740 and 426 lei respectively, thereby causing the State to lose a sum of five hundred million lei.

The accusation of bribery was denied by those involved, but it was decided that the contract would have to be revised and the matter submitted to the Law-Courts. This Swedish company is related to the Kreuger & Toll groups, and it is more than likely that the contract will now lapse.

491 The following data concerning the highways and their distribution among the different provinces, also of their condition at the beginning of 1930, is found in the statistical bulletin for that year:

	Roads laid in stone.			Roads in	Natural unlaid
Province.	Good.	Medium.	Bad.	gravel.	roads.
Old Kingdom	13,043.722	13,607.486	5,887.907	5,042.919	12,848.255
Transylvania	4,511.625	10,558.301	6,180.164	3,504.744	19,585.426
Bucovina	444.095	923.923	889.304	444.373	665.603
Bessarabia	165.851	384.281	106.640	370.378	7,089.472
Total for all Rumania in kilometres	18,165.293	25,473.991	13,064.015	9,362.414	40,188.756

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12: Korinos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

793 The poor clergy are very active in politics and
● 661 public affairs generally. Their influence, and even
more that of the bishops, has not infrequently been
[212] abused to further private interests.[1] The majority
of the Rumanians are only semi-literate and depend
for their information and guidance on the priests.
871 Education has been the weak point of almost all the Rumanian governments. But those Rumanians whose parents have been able to give them a good education have proved that this highly intelligent and gifted people can achieve success in all fields of science and the arts.

563 **THE HUNGARIANS AND THE SZEKELYS.** The Hungarians and Szekelys, most of whom came under Rumanian rule after the Great War, live chiefly in Transylvania and the western provinces of Greater Rumania. The forefathers of the Szekelys were brought to these territories by the Hungarian kings and charged with the task of defending and securing the Kingdom's frontiers. The Hungarian nobles and Szekelys were two of the 'Three Ruling Nations' of Transylvania.[2] They were supported and encouraged by their kin in Hungary proper, given many privileges in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Thanks to all this they were able

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[1] One blatant example of this occurred about ten years ago when a shepherd, who claimed to have 'visions' and prophetic power was built up into a holy figure. The simple peasants flocked to see and hear him, bringing many gifts. The State railways organized special travel facilities and this enriched many officials and members of the clergy.

[2] The three 'united' or 'recognized nations' of Transylvania were the Hungarian nobility, the Szekelys and the Saxons.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1914

ED¹ Rumania ED1

563 similar position. Only a small number of Bulgarians in the Banat, famous as first-class market-gardeners and fruit-growers, were comparatively well off. There live in Wallachia and in the Banat a number of Serbs, settled there as frontier guards by the Austrian emperors. Some live in villages of their own, some together with German, Rumanian or Hungarian communities. They have strong ties with Yugoslavia, and have achieved comparative prosperity.

THE JEWS. The Jews, who are to be found in all Rumanian provinces and have big communities in Bessarabia and in the Bukovina, have always been a persecuted and oppressed minority. The brand of anti-Semitism encouraged by almost all Rumanian governments resembles that of Tsarist Russia. [661] Whenever something went wrong in politics or economics the Jews were blamed for it and pogroms were organized, sometimes surpassing in violence those of the Tsarist regime. This traditional anti-Semitism has its roots in the period when wealthy Rumanian absentee landlords let their estates to Jewish agents for management and tax-collection. This was a convenient means of laying the blame for exploitation at the door of the Jews, whilst the *boiars* pocketed the taxes and rents.[1] Jewish influence in Rumanian finance and trade has been very great, as was their share in introducing modern industries into the country. Many Jewish families, especially in Moldavia and Wallachia, can trace their association with Rumania back to the early Phanariots. Others have lived for many years in the

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[1] Some of the Jewish managers of estates deserved all that came to them; but the resentment which they caused was frequently visited quite unjustly upon obscure Jews who did no kind of harm to their Gentile neighbours.

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

[Bessarabia]

On 8 April 1918 the Representative Council of Bessarabia,[1] *Sfatul Tari*, by 86 votes to 3, 36 delegates abstaining, decided to become an autonomous part of Rumania. This step was sanctioned by Germany when the Treaty of Bucarest was signed one month later. In November of the same year, 1918, after the Armistice, it was decided at a session of the Representative Council, attended by only 46 delegates, to declare for the unconditional union of Bessarabia with Rumania. The annexation of Bessarabia was not recognized by the Peace Conference at Paris; and although recognition was promised by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1920, this undertaking was never ratified by all the Powers. 635 175

During the following years Bessarabia was treated as a conquered province. All district councils and other organs of local government were abolished. The country was ruled by prefects appointed by and responsible to the central government in Bucarest. The province was strongly garrisoned and lived in a continuous state of siege. All communications over the Dniester were destroyed and anybody caught attempting to cross the frontier was either imprisoned or shot. Between 1918 and 1924 there were a hundred and thirty-five uprisings in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the military with the utmost violence. In the course of these revolts it is estimated that over thirty thousand Bessarabians were killed, many more executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The peasant revolt of 1924 in the region around the town of Tatar-Bunar was put down after heavy fighting and the burning of many villages. 635 661 ● 669

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[1] The Council was composed of 138 deputies of whom 103 were Rumanian, 13 Ukrainian, 7 Russian, 6 Jewish, 2 Bulgarian, 1 Pole and 1 Armenian.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

511 capital had been imported, had come to an abrupt end only a few years later. The prices of agricultural produce continued to fall and manufactured goods became comparatively more expensive. While the value of money decreased[1] and the general level of the standard of living deteriorated up to about 1930, there was a slight improvement in the period following the recovery from the general crisis.

• 661 CORRUPTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION. The lot of the people, however, did not improve. The Rumanians, to whom their government had promised an era of prosperity and national splendour, soon found that the promise held good only for some privileged classes who had not been badly off before. The whole country was ruled by a small clique which had secured the allegiance of a host of civil servants. These officials were badly paid and relied on bribes to swell their income. Before elections the voters were promised reductions of taxation and official positions. But taxes became heavier each year and the new officials' greed had to be satisfied whenever one came in touch with the State apparatus. Identification papers of every description had to be secured before a citizen could go about his business. And in order to obtain these documents one had to visit innumerable offices, fill up innumerable forms and bribe a dozen officials. Arrests were made by the underpaid police for the sole purpose of obtaining money. Officials in all positions looked upon bribes as a legitimate source of income.

The poor peasantry and the minorities were

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465 [1] Level wages in 1930 were: in Rumania 39; in Britain 100.

especially hard hit by this rampant corruption. The 661 moneyed classes, on the other hand, were well satisfied with this state of affairs which guaranteed the continuance of their rule.

The position of the minorities was unenviable. 563 In theory all non-Rumanians had the same rights 641 and duties as the Rumanians. In practice, however, things were very different. The official language was Rumanian and anybody not able to speak Rumanian was handicapped from the beginning when dealing with the authorities. It was very difficult for members of a minority to obtain schooling in their native language, for although there were some Hungarian and German schools they had to be financed by the respective communities and the fees to be paid were high. A public career for a member of a minority was very rare indeed and non-Rumanians had always to expect unfavourable treatment at the hands of the authorities. The Jews, many of whom were denied Rumanian citizenship and had to pay from time to time for the right to live in the country, were worse off than the rest. Often in addition to being persecuted for their origin they could be victimized for having a Hungarian name and speaking German as their native language.

The mass of the Rumanians did not gain by this 661 discrimination ostensibly made in their favour. At 565 best the half-educated sons of peasants could secure some minor position in the State machinery.

The economic life of the country was dominated 471 by all-powerful monopolies. The oil and heavy industries were in the hands of a few foreign and Rumanian shareholders and the enormous profits were divided between a few industrialists, ministers

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

mentary seats. This device, combined with the 666
electoral methods adopted, normally assured the 665
continuance of the government in power.[1] In
Foreign Affairs the Liberals supported the French [648]
Alliance and the League of Nations in whose councils the Foreign Minister, N. Titulescu, had considerable influence.

The National Peasant Party led by Maniu and 665
Mihalache had the support of the rural population and represented the Left Wing of Rumanian politics. The party stood for a genuine Land Reform. It was not, however, a homogeneous party. From the first it had a Right and a Left Wing. As time went on, and especially when the political situation became more confused in the late thirties, the Right Wing tended to sympathize with the Iron Guard against the Royal dictatorship and the Left Wing with the Communists. The failure of the National Peasant Party to hold power after 1928 was due to the lack of confidence in the people, the fear of radical changes favoured by many sections of the population and hesitation to attack the firmly entrenched vested interests resolutely.

Although Rumania had a parliamentary constitu- 661
tion the country was ruled by anything but democratic methods. Parliamentary representatives, ministers and the press could be made to advocate and carry out any measure if adequately paid by interested parties. The corruption of the lower civil service seemed as nothing compared with that on the top. State contracts, exemption from taxes and

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[1] It failed only twice: in 1928 when the National Peasant Party gained an electoral victory and in 1937 when Tatarescu's government fell.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

661 preferential legislation, the right to exploit natural resources under State control, could all be and were secured by Rumanian and foreign trusts for comparatively small sums. The mismanagement and appropriation of public money by government officials, including the court, had ruinous consequences for the population which knew about these things, but was unable to do anything about it. [651] Indirect taxation, heavier and more ingenious than anywhere else in Europe, provided an inexhaustible source of income for those in power. The 'aviation-stamp', for example, which had to be affixed on every bill, theatre- and cinema-ticket, etc., was supposed to secure a strong Rumanian Air Force. In fact Rumania possessed hardly any aircraft at all as the funds were misappropriated throughout.

648 661 **THE ROYAL DICTATORSHIP.** The instability of Rumania's economic and political life and her geographical position made the country extremely sensitive to any changes in Central Europe. Therefore the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the risings of February and June 1934 in Austria and world reactions to these events had [668] immediate repercussions in Rumania. The Liberal Prime Minister Duca was assassinated in December 1933 by members of the Iron Guard. Tatarescu took over and decreed a state of siege, which has not been lifted since, ostensibly to repress and destroy the Iron Guard. In fact exactly the opposite course was adopted. The democratic forces which began to rally in order to fight Rumanian Fascism were persecuted by the government whilst the terrorists were allowed to continue their activities.

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

563 steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital
471 of six million pounds sterling, and many other
factories also passed under German control. In the
[439] fight against Franco-British and American capital
in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that
50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36%
of the country's exports went to Germany (1938).
By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the
total.

This underground activity of the German
563 minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings
668 of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to
lose their privileges and were only too glad to join
in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption
reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country
economically, politically and morally. It had become
an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

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661 [1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organisations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

the pro-Nazi group. This, combined with the 665
developments in the regions bordering on Rumania, 648
and the changes in the international situation, explain the seemingly inexplicable migration of the majority of the Rumanian ruling class from the Allies' to the Axis camp. The real rulers of Rumania depended to a great extent on foreign support: when the power of Britain and France seemed on the wane they had to look for new protectors, and many, though not all, therefore became pro-German.

THE LAST DAYS OF GREATER RUMANIA. The year 661
1939 opened ominously for Rumania. The align-
ment of power on the continent of Europe had its 648
counterpart in the grouping of Rumania's political forces, and the impending Great War threw its shadow on the sombre scene of Rumanian politics. After the assassination of Codreanu in November 1938 a wave of terror and repression swept the whole country, which resulted in a series of wholesale murders committed both by Iron Guards and the police. The new 'Party of the Nation' which had replaced the 'Front of National Renaissance' was an artificial veil for the manipulations of Carol and the court. The unstable political edifice, erected by the king tottered, in spite of the British Government's guarantee of 13 April 1939, which promised to assist in the defence of Rumania's independence. Germany increased her pressure to obtain a greater hold on Rumania's natural resources, while Britain and France tried to maintain their economic position.

At the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 Rumania, although allied to France and Poland, remained neutral. The internal situation deteriorated

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12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

661 648 with alarming speed. The assassination of Calinescu, who had been responsible for the murder of Codreanu and others, was followed by yet another series of savage reprisals. The collapse of Poland brought a flood of refugees into the country and made Rumania's international position even more difficult. Many Poles were interned, many managed to bribe their way through to a port or across the frontiers.

648 In the economic field the Rumanian government tried to repeat the policy which its predecessor had pursued in the period 1914–16, when it profited from deals concluded with both belligerent camps. This time, however, German penetration was much more thorough and the economic agreements concluded between Germany and Rumania reinforced Germany's capacity to wage war very considerably. This naturally led to important consequences in the field of internal politics. In spite of the very recent repressive measures against the Iron Guard, Carol now adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards this organization. Now that Codreanu had been eliminated, he sought to strengthen his position by including Iron Guards in his government, amongst them Horia Sima who had become their leader. This seemed all the more necessary as the king's isolation in internal politics had its counterpart in the country's isolation in the international field. The revisionist claims of Rumania's neighbours were raised again, and Carol tried to rally the people by embarking on an intensive policy of rearmament for the defence of Greater Rumania. Distrust in the king and the general disintegration had, however, gone so far that the continuance of the whole régime

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944

ED1 Rumania ED1

643 he had played off one political party against the
668 other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign
648 politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by
completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 **RUMANIA GOES TO WAR.** General I. Antonescu,
661 having obtained Carol's abdication,[1] pronounced
himself 'Conductor', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating

[1] [Sept 6, 1940--Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
ED1 Rumania ED1

up of Jews became the favourite occupation of the 641
legionaries. The resulting confusion helped many 642
minor officials as well as influential business men in
acquiring valuable property.

But it soon became obvious that the real masters 648
of Rumania were the Germans. In October 1940 642
Antonescu invited German troops into the country
as instructors for the Rumanian Army. German 649
trade delegations began organizing Rumania's economy and German specialists were appointed to important positions in various ministries. Although Antonescu had included the Iron Guard in his government, the struggle for power between him and Horia Sima continued. In January 1941 the Iron Guard, supporting the latter, made a last bid. The legionaries rose in revolt and succeeded in gaining several strong positions in Bucarest and in some provincial towns. The army, however, sided with Antonescu, who was also aided by the Germans, and within a short time the 'Conducator' emerged as victor. He at once proceeded to the establishment of a completely military administration and based his whole regime on the army.

His[1] success in the fight against the Iron Guard 721
was influenced decisively by the German desire to
create a stable Rumanian government which would
join in the attack on the Soviet Union. Antonescu
did not fail his German masters. On 22 June 1941
Rumanian troops, together with German divisions,
crossed the Soviet frontier. Thanks to German 721
support, Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina 727
were re-occupied within a short time. Both provinces were put under a military administration and ruled quite separately from the rest of Rumania.

[1] [i.e.: Antonescu -- Analyst]

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Crimea and Kharkov in 1941. But they became 721 alarming when the Red Army began the great counter-offensive in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad, where five Rumanian divisions under General Lascar were wiped out or put out of action. In May 1943 Antonescu said the Rumanian losses were 500,000, referring apparently to killed and prisoners only. Since then the great German retreat has probably caused many more Rumanian losses. During 1943 the government's action in sending Rumanian troops beyond the old frontier was repeatedly condemned by the leaders of the opposition—Peasants and Liberals. The Minister of War answered these objections by saying, 'It is lucky for us that the war is so far away. If we had to fight so powerful an opponent on the Dniester or the Pruth, all Rumania would be ruins.' But within a year the avenging fate had not rested on the Pruth.

OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION. The effects of 661
Antonescu's dictatorial regime showed themselves in 642
all spheres of Rumanian life. Politically the country was ruled by the army generals and in all other fields by Rumanian and German big business. Military administrators replaced local government in the provinces and the towns. The Rumanian industrialists and bankers found it very profitable to work for the German war economy. Their political enemies were liquidated or driven under-ground. In the economic field their exploitation of the people and of the country's resources was only limited by Germany's interests.

Both the political and the economic life ~~of~~ 000

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June, 1940	137.1.
January, 1941	149.5.
June, 1941	190.9.
January, 1942	200.6.
June, 1942	306.9.
January, 1943	377.6.
March, 1943	403.9.

The less marked rise in 1942 was due principally to the fact that for the first 6 months of the year prices were almost stationary; in the autumn, however, indirect taxes were increased and prices once again rose steeply.

These percentages represent only increases in official prices; the cost of living is in fact considerably higher owing to the prevalence of the Black Market, where prices are very much in excess of the official limits.

The first attempts at price control were made almost immediately after the outbreak of war. In September 1939 an anti-profiteering law was passed, and in November of the same year an anti-speculation law followed, which fixed the maximum prices of all articles in general use and limited wholesalers' profits to 10 per cent. and retailers' to 12 per cent.

The regulations were further tightened up by the price control laws of March, 1942, and the sabotage law of October, 1940.

Control, however, remained largely ineffective, and in October 1941 a stabilisation law was passed. This law, which borrowed much from the existing German laws, laid down a general price stop. Maximum prices and wages were fixed at the level prevailing on 1st September, 1941, and alterations could be made only with the permission of the Minister of Economics.

In addition the State set up goods distribution centres which, among other functions, supervised producers' prices, profit margins and consumers' prices.

Since August 1942 the supervision of prices has been in the hands of a General Commissariat for Price Control, and the local offices subordinate to it. It is evident that corruption among price-control officials was by no means a negligible factor in the very unsatisfactory development of the control system in general. In the autumn of 1942 it was announced that all existing price controllers were to be dismissed and replaced by members of the teaching, legal and literary professions. ● [661]

B. BANKING

1. State and State-Controlled Banks

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The National Bank of Rumania was set up in 1880 with a capital of 30 million lei, of which one-third was in the hands of the State. By 1929 this had been raised to 600 million lei. Under the present statute the State may not hold more than ten per cent. of the capital; the remaining ninety per cent. must be held by private shareholders. This bank has the sole right of note issue for the country.

From the end of 1930 to the end of 1938 the note circulation rose from 19·6 milliard lei to 34·9 milliard lei. In the next four years, however, the increase was very much greater as the following table shows:—

		Milliard lei
1939	January	34·1
	June	38·7
1940	January	48·4
	June	54·2
1941	January	65·7
	June	77·1
1942	January	95·6
	June	98·7
1943	January	117·0

[52 b]

E. THE JEWISH POPULATION

162 The Jewish population of Rumania for 1938 is given as 800,000, and for July, 1942, as 270,000. This reduction came about as follows :—

Total, 1938	800,000
Lost to Hungary	200,000
[728] Taken to Russia from Bessarabia and Bucovina by Russians	130,000
Expelled from Bessarabia and other areas by Rumanians to Transnistria, and deaths from unnatural causes in Rumania .. .. [661]	200,000
Total losses	530,000
Total, 1942	270,000

The occupational distribution of the Jews in 1930 :—

		Per cent.
Agriculture		4·1
Industry and trade	32·8	81·1
Commerce and credit	48·3	
Transport		2·4
Professions and Public Services ..		2·7
Army		1·9
Miscellaneous		7·8

It is calculated that in 1939 at least one-sixth of the industrial and half of the commercial population were Jews. During the war Rumanian policy 563 661 has been to exclude Jews from business and from commercial and professional activity. This process of Rumanisation, while pursued ruthlessly in the provinces of Bessarabia and Bucovina, has been limited in the more industrial areas such as Bucarest by the simple fact that Rumanian industry and trade are dependent to such an extent on Jewish capital and leadership, and there is no doubt that the shortage of labour in industry has been seriously aggravated by the anti-Jewish policy. The degree of Rumanisation so far achieved is given by the following examples :—

Bucarest :—	
Number of firms employing Jews, November 1940	8,126
Number of firms employing Jews, December 1942	4,301

Such Jews as are deemed necessary for war production are granted labour permits, whereby they may remain in their profession, but are subject to heavy taxation. Jews who are expelled from their normal activity are compulsorily enrolled in the Jewish labour service and employed chiefly on road work, or, alternatively, they are sent to concentration camps.

(*See* also " Note on Jews in Rumania," Part II, Chapter VIII.)

F. WAGES

1. General

465 The average wage (industrial, commercial and agricultural professions) in 1938 was 1,853 lei per month. The highest average wages were found in the mining, food and transport industries, followed by commerce, textiles, skins, glass and stone, while in the metallurgical industry wages were below the average. The most noticeable feature of pre-war Rumanian wage statistics is the great regional variations, the extreme averages being 889 and 3,059 lei per month.

During the war, various attempts at fixing the wage level have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. On the whole it would have been surprising if a wage stop could have been successfully applied in Rumania, because of the great

[56b]

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe

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pean Front ended, it became a major factor in the new Romanian 704 * Army. The Horia-Closca-Crisan Division was organized later and 648 did not become quite so important in the War but it also provided much thoroughly indoctrinated personnel for the Communist regime. *

Another group of ex-PW officers returned long after the war was 701 * over. In 1946 the Communists sent back 500 specially selected and 648 indoctrinated officers. Those 500 officers were led by the then Colonel Victor Draganescu, a career artillery officer who has since become Major General, Ministerial Councillor in the Ministry of Interior, and commander of security troops. These 500 officers were greeted by big Communist-sponsored demonstrations and their return was presented as a token of Soviet magnanimity. Draganescu said, "We express our gratitude toward Generalissimo Stalin, because of his large understanding granted the Rumanian Government in allowing Rumanian prisoners to return even before the conclusion of peace."[27]

Re-trained PW's were thus one major source of Communist officers. Another source was a para-military force organized beginning in the autumn of 1944 by Emil Bodnaras. This was the "Guard of Patriotic Defense." It was equipped by the Soviet Occupation Army from captured German supplies. At the same time a law was passed incorporating all "anti-fascist fighters" into the Romanian Army in a bloc. "Actually the number of Partisans operating in Rumania during the war against Germany had been infinitesimal."[28] They were mainly organized afterwards by the Communists who decided who was to be considered as having been an anti-fascist fighter. Under this law such leading Communist politicians as Emil Bodnaras, Vasile Luca, George Vasilichi, and Ana Pauker became generals.

Another special force which the Communists built was that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (for a while divorced from that Ministry and placed in a separate Ministry of State Security, but perhaps now recombined.) The government of the Romanian People's Republic has devoted much attention to these special security forces. Some measure of their importance is revealed by the fact that a couple of years ago the budget for these troops was considerably larger than that of the Ministry of Armed Forces.[29] A more satisfactory index of relative size is troops. The troops under the Ministry of Interior number at least 120,000, but probably 160,000, while the regular army was estimated by Tito as 300,000 in 1950, but is probably only 225,000. *

While the ranks of the officers corps were being filled with Com- 701 * munists, regular officers were dismissed en masse after the War. 648 The first purge had already occurred with the coup d'état of August 1944 even before the Communists were involved. The Sanatescu gov- 661 ernment formed at that time was staffed largely by generals who had not been closely identified with the previous Antonescu regime or who, like Generals Radescu and Aldea, had opposed it. The generals

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
Rumania ED1

* 701 *648 661 and admirals who had been most intimately associated with Antonescu were arrested and several, among them Generals Antonescu, Pantazi, and Vasiliu, were taken to the Soviet Union, where they were questioned and held until their trials in Bucharest in 1946.

With the end of the War the purge went further. Procedures for elimination of war criminals and collaborators were laid down in 1945 and numerous trials were held in 1946. At the same time the size of the army was being cut and many officers were simply dismissed. The Treaty of Paris in 1946 provided that the total military forces of Romania (including land, air, and marine force as well as frontier guards) could not exceed 138,000. The actual number of troops in active service at one time fell as low as 90,000. These were culled from fifteen regular divisions and two Communist divisions which had fought the Germans. The reduction in force was pushed as an ideal opportunity to get rid of political opponents.

The Communist take-over did not occur without resistance. The years from 1945 through 1950 were marked by a series of successively more stringent Communist demands for control.

668 643 The first prime minister after the coup was General Sanatescu. He was not sufficiently acceptable to the Russians and on December 6, 1944, he was replaced by General Nicolae Radescu, who had been known as an opponent of Antonescu and the Nazis and had spent some time in a concentration camp. Radescu, however, was by no means a pro-Communist or a Communist tool and he also lasted only briefly, being ousted on February 27, 1945 at the demand of Vyshinski, the Russian representative in Romania. A few days later a government was formed by Dr. Petru Groza who also had not been a Communist. He was indeed one of the wealthiest men in Romania and had been something of a collaborator with the Nazis, but he was sufficiently pliable to be used by the Russians for a considerable period. It was not until June 2, 1952, that he was replaced as Prime Minister by a top Communist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej. Groza is still a figurehead in Romanian politics under the title of President of the Presidium.

* 701 *648 661 With the formation of the Groza government there came the first major shake-up in the army command. During the succeeding twelve months thousands of officers were removed. General Ion Negulescu, Minister of National Defense, was replaced by General Constantin Rascanu, a man who had been Chief of the Military Police under the Antonescu regime and later was disgraced and sent home from the front for engaging in black market operations. He ingratiated himself with the Communists by leading the group of officers who forced Radescu out of office.

During 1946 the non-Communist officers showed increased resistance to the sovietization of the army and the country. Toward the end of the year the Communists decided upon a further shake-up. Rascanu was discharged as Minister of the Armed Forces and replaced by General Mihail Lascar, former prisoner of war, who had served in the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division. Before that he had fought well on

9: Pool S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
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the German side as commander of a brigade on the Russian front. 701 *
He was then a major general and was decorated by the Germans with 648
the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and promoted to the rank of General
of the Army. Before his capture he was often called the 'hero of 661 ●
Stalingrad.' After his capture by the Russians, however, he co-operated well with them. Lascar served as Minister of Armed Forces until replaced by Emil Bodnaras in the next major shake-up on December 24, 1947. Lascar then became Inspector General of the Army and First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, a position which he held until the subsequent shake-up in March of 1950.

Of all these turning points perhaps the most important was that 669
of December 1947, the Romanian counterpart of the Prague coup of
a month and a half later. In December 1947 Emil Bodnaras took over
and at the same time King Michael was forced to abdicate. That was *
the decisive shift in both the political and military spheres. General 701 *
Lascar, Bodnaras' predecessor, had been a career officer even if
an indoctrinated one. Bodnaras, on the other hand, was a long-time 648
Communist whose military career had ended in disgrace.

Bodnaras was born in the early 1900's in Bucovina. According to the usual story his father was a Ruthenian peasant of Ukrainian background and his mother a German. One of our informants who knew him indicates, however, that that is not so, and it seems that we have here one of the many cases in which interested refugee circles prefer to label current Communist leaders as foreigners rather than admit that their own nationals can be traitors.

In the middle 1920's Bodnaras went to military school and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1927. From 1927 to 1930 he took an artillery course and in the latter year was promoted to first lieutenant. At the time he became involved in Communist espionage, and when caught fled to Russia. He was tried in absentia for desertion and espionage and sentenced to five years imprisonment. In 1933 he attempted to slip back into Romania, was caught and served the years from 1933 to 1936 in prison. At that time he escaped and again went to live in the U.S.S.R. During World War II Bodnaras was assigned to party organizational and propaganda activities rather than to fighting the Germans. When the war was over, the Communists placed him as Secretary of State in the office of the Prime Minister, a job concerned with the secret intelligence service. He was in this position until the Soviets decided to take complete control of the army and to communize and develop it.

When Bodnaras took over, he brought in a new group of deputy ministers and changed many commands. The end result of his activities to date is a situation in which Communist party militants control the very top positions but quite a few career officers remain in posts just below them. This result was reached in a zigzag course of three stages.

1. The reorganization in the period from December 1947 to 1950

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paralleled what was happening in all the satellites at the same period. The army was reorganized according to Soviet patterns, and supplies and equipment were brought into uniformity with Soviet standards. Instrumentalities were developed for strict political surveillance within the military forces. Provision was made for an elaborate program of political indoctrination and the Guard of Patriotic Defense was integrated in 1949 with the troops operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The process of purging hit old Communists, officers of the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions, and career officers alike, but it was most vigorously directed against the latter. Still career officers continued to play a role at all levels. It is not clear from our sources whether there were at that time the usual three or perhaps four deputy ministers of the armed forces, but of these three or four deputy ministers two continued to be career officers until March 1950.[30]

2. In March 1950 party militants came to fill all the deputy minister posts and from then until 1952 the emphasis seemed to be on Bolshevisation.

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3. The most recent major shake-up came in April of 1952 when five fliers of the Romanian Air Force flew to Yugoslavia. At that time the discharges hit not only prewar career officers, but also many of the Communist officers. These included the Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces, Major General Constantin Doncea, who is reported to have been executed, and Major General Villiam Suder, Inspector General of the Army and also Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces. Suder then became Minister of the Coal Industry, from which position he has now been dismissed, and he is presumably in disgrace. The military shake-up of 1952 is not well covered in the data yet available outside Romania. We, however, may take the discharge of two vice-ministers as a sign of a rather far-reaching and drastic shake-up at other levels too. The shake-up of late 1952 may well have marked a reaction to the dominance of incompetent politicians in favor of professional soldiers. The refugee Buletinul Militar of October 1953 informs us that "For about 6 months the Communist Party has made big efforts through the Ministry of Armed Forces to recruit career military men who had been previously removed as dangerous. They are promised either directly or indirectly very attractive advantages if they apply for recall in the active cadres of the Army." At the same time Communist officers are apparently being purged, and in typical Soviet fashion the charge leveled at the victims is that of doing precisely what the regime itself is doing. The nature of the regime's policy is thus camouflaged. "Numerous officers converted from civilians by the Party have been found guilty of conniving with career officers. Some of those, guilty of sincerity and naivete, have been thrown into Communist jails."[30a]

Whatever the latest trend, however, the period since 1948 was notable both for the retention of a significant number of career officers

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and for their subordination to a group of Communist generals who in turn took their orders from Soviet officers.

C. The Leading Cadres of the Present Romanian Army

Let us attempt a somewhat more detailed analysis of the two main identifiable groups of present general officers: the career officers and the old Communists.

We have biographies on ninety-one generals who have been in the army at some time since the Russian forces reached Romania toward the end of the last war. Of these forty-four have not been purged as of our latest information. Among these forty-four generals who are still in good repute with the regime, twenty-four are career officers and only twenty are new Communist officers. The reliance upon prewar cadres becomes even more clear when we note that five of the twenty Communist officers are no longer active in military positions but have transferred back to civilian political work and nine are in security posts not under the Ministry of Armed Forces. Thus our sample of Communist militants currently active in army affairs is reduced to six. The table below gives a breakdown of the sample of postwar officers.

TABLE 5

Romanian Generals in the Sample

Career officers who have not been purged	24	
Communist officers who have not been purged	20	
Total who have not been purged		44
Career officers purged in 1944	8	
Career officers purged in 1945	14	
Career officers purged in 1946	5	
Career officers purged in 1947	4	
Career officers purged in 1948	4	
Career officers purged in 1949	2	
Career officers purged in 1950	4	
Career officers purged in 1951	3	
Career officers purged in 1952	1	
Total career officers purged	45	
Communist officers purged	2*	
Total purged		47
Grand total		91
Total career officers	69	
Total Communists	22	

*One in 1952, one in 1953.

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While the ranks of the career officers have been ruthlessly purged, the purging has been selective. What criteria have been applied in selecting officers who have been reprieved and continue to be tolerated even now? The outstanding criterion has been Soviet experience. The Russians have trusted those officers whom they captured and indoctrinated during World War II. Of the forty-four officers who have been purged, only four (i.e. 9 percent) are known to have been prisoners of war. At least nine of the twenty-four officers still in office were such indoctrinated prisoners and at least one more fought under the Russians (i.e. 42 percent). We do not know the complete wartime careers of certain generals in the sample. If we did the contrast might well be still more striking. Within our sample only one career officer still in a position of command can definitely be established as not having been a Russian prisoner of war. Russian experience seems to be the passport of a considerable majority of the career officers whom the Russians have continued to trust in important military posts.

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When we turn to the Communists we also find that Russian experience and Russian affiliations are an important element in advancement. Of the twenty Communist generals who retain positions of power we know that at least nine have had Soviet experience and regarding the other half we are simply uninformed. Probably many of these have also been in Russia. Four of the twenty Communist generals in our sample are themselves Russians camouflaged as Romanians. Two others were in Russia as Communists and helped organize the Romanian Communist divisions, as did also one of the two purged Communists.

As in Poland, Communist generals are heavily concentrated in the political administration of the army and in the special security troops. The lines between posts reserved for Communists and other posts are not drawn quite so sharply in Romania as they have been in Poland. Four of the twenty-four officers in our current career officer sample have security or police jobs rather than regular military jobs. One, Major General Nicolae Dobre, career artillery officer, is reported to be Chief of Staff of the security troops. A second career artillery officer is Major General Victor Draganescu, ex-prisoner of war of the Russians. He was reported in 1952 to be in command of security troops. One career general, Major General Alexander Petrescu, is president of the political department of the Military Court of Justice. He qualified himself for this job by a record as the outstanding war criminal under the Nazis. During the Antonescu regime he was Director General of concentration camps and also had sentenced several Communists to death. He was dismissed from service in 1944 but one year later he was again president of the political section of the Bucharest Military Tribunal. In that position he presided when the Communists tried Iuliu Maniu, the Peasant party leader.

While these few career men hold jobs in the security field, most such jobs are held by Communists and a considerable number by Russians disguised as Romanian Communists. There are four of the

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661 electoral results a coalition government should be set up, and in this they secured the Ministry of the Interior and thus made ready to stage a coup at the opportune moment. That moment came in May 1947. Maniu's turn came in July 1947. He was arrested, the National Peasant Party was dissolved, and three months later he was put on trial before a military court presided over by Colonel Alexandru Petrescu. This officer had worn many uniforms and (as W. H. Lawrence who covered the trial for *The New York Times* recalled) had once filled the same judicial office under the pro-Nazi Antonescu dictatorship when the prisoners in the dock usually were Jews or were charged with being Communists or anti-Fascists, equally reprehensible in those days. After a two-week trial which travestied anything that we would call a judicial proceeding, Maniu was convicted and given solitary imprisonment for life. With him were sentenced Ion Mihalache, Vice President of the National Peasant Party, and other associates.

By the end of 1947 the Communists had dealt with all political rivals in Eastern Europe who had particular influence with the peasant masses. Whether the peasant leaders temporized or were rigid, collaborated or fought back, their fate was different only in degree: for some death, for some prison, for some exile.

Six weeks after Maniu was sentenced, King Michael, who had struggled to diminish his royal prerogatives to the point where they might be combined with a Communist dictatorship, and who occasionally seemed to be succeeding, was ordered to abdicate and leave [642] the country. The Rumanian People's Republic was proclaimed December 30, 1947. No political focus of opposition was left—reactionary, bourgeois, agrarian, democratic or Socialist.

665 661 Moscow even so did not feel that the situation in Rumania was all it should be. A core of nationalist sentiment seemed to remain inside the Communist organization itself, and it was ordered cut out. The man selected to serve as an example was an old Party stalwart and cabinet member, Lucretiu Patrascanu. He had been a Communist member of Parliament in the twenties, a leader of the Communist underground during the war and head of the commission sent to Moscow to negotiate the Rumanian armistice. In the cabinets preceding Groza's he had been Minister of Justice, and Vyshin-

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sky thought him sufficiently reliable to allot him the same important position in the new setup. *The Daily Worker*[4] praised him in those days "for his staunch defense of leading anti-Fascists, such as Professor Constantinescu-Iasi, Ana Pauker and the railway strike leaders before the military and civil Rumanian tribunals," and added the information that he had joined the Rumanian Communist Party when it was first organized in 1920 and had been editor of the official Party organ, *Scanteia*, from 1921 to 1924. Patrascanu's administration of the Rumanian judicial system continued to be satisfactory at least to the end of 1947, for he was retained in the same post in the new republican cabinet formed after Michael's abdication.

Less than two months later, at a Congress when the rump groups still calling themselves "Social Democratic" joined the Communists to form the new Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist), Teohari Georgescu, Minister of the Interior, suddenly rose to assail Patrascanu as a deviationist. Like the accused, the accuser was a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Georgescu's complaint was that Patrascanu had fallen "under the influence of the bourgeoisie" and "had become an exponent of bourgeois ideology." As this happened at the end of February 1948, when only the innermost circle of Cominform authorities knew that Moscow was stigmatizing Tito as a bourgeois deviationist, we cannot tell whether the two developments were connected or whether Patrascanu merely happened to reveal some tendency toward independence at an unfortunate moment.

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Tito had been in Bucharest at the end of December 1947 to sign the Jugoslav-Rumanian pact of friendship and mutual assistance, and half a million persons had assembled at an open-air rally to hear him speak. "It was a great triumph," Mosha Pijade has written—in fact, Pijade admits, too great a triumph, "for it started personal jealousy where none of us expected it." He adds: "When Comrade Tito achieved triumphs during his visits to Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, it was too much for them. Sick vanity threw the interests of world Socialism into the dirt."[5] If Patrascanu

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[4] New York, November 11, 1944.

[5] *Borba*, Belgrade, September 26 and 29, 1949.

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had not heard that Tito was in danger, he might have made up to him too openly. Maybe he happened to be one of those to whom Tito mentioned the troubles he was having with the Soviets, and maybe some informer transmitted a sympathetic comment to Moscow. A few days after Tito left Bucharest, Dimitrov arrived to sign a similar treaty of friendship on behalf of Bulgaria. This was the occasion where the exuberant Rumanian welcome is supposed to have gone to Dimitrov's head, leading him to speak imprudently about forming a wide federation of East European states as an offset to Soviet hegemony. Was Patrascanu implicated in the indiscretions for which the Bulgarian Prime Minister apologized so abjectly after returning to Sofia? Perhaps the international events merely coincided with Patrascanu's fall. Perhaps he was purged simply because his background was Rumanian rather than Muscovite (he apparently never was in Moscow until 1944), and suspects were being gotten rid of everywhere in preparation for the showdown with Tito. He had spent the war in the Rumanian underground and Rumanian jails and knew the country as Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and other Moscow-trained Communists did not. He may easily have had ideas about the importance of Rumanian national feelings and perhaps even a feeling of his own for Rumanian national interests which would have been alien to the Muscovites. Whether this or something more specific accounts for his disgrace must remain speculation. What is on record is that he was denounced as a bourgeois and nationalist and expelled from the Party to which he had belonged for 28 years.

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The purge begun with Patrascanu went wide and deep. In the Cominform journal for February 10, 1950, the Secretary-General of the Central Committee, Alexandru Moghiorosh, reported that the "ever sharpening class struggle" had necessitated a thorough housecleaning of "bestial, alien and opportunist elements." In all, he said, 18 percent of the Party members had been dropped. On the date when the remnants of the so-called Social Democratic parties merged with the Communists, the combined strength of the new Rumanian Workers' Party was said to be about a million. This would indicate a purge of something like 180,000 individuals found to be lacking in Communist zeal or trustworthiness. Moghiorosh warned that "the

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Anglo-American imperialists and their Titoist agents" would try 661
to disrupt the Party in the future as in the past, and he asked for
redoubled revolutionary vigilance against "all deviations from the 665
Party line."

Those who were not purged were vigorously educated in the same 661
ideas which Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai had brought to the atten- 665
tion of their followers. They were informed that in Rumania as else- 565
where one of the touchstones of conformity to the new Moscow line was to be the attitude of the Parties toward the peasants. In the early days of their power, the Rumanian Communists had aimed to make private ownership of land unpopular by proving it unprofitable. As in the other satellites, they had set high tax rates on land, imposed high indirect taxes on salt, matches and other commodities which the peasant could not avoid buying, fixed high prices for manufactured goods in comparison with agricultural produce, offered special favors to peasants who joined collectives and in other ways demonstrated the hazards and costs of independent farming with a view to bringing the peasants to favor collectivization, as it were of their own accord. Minister of the Interior Georgescu signalled the end of this era of persuasion, if it can be called that, in the spring of 1949.

Georgescu joined the ranks of Dimitrov, Bierut and Revai with a 665
contribution to the Cominform journal for June 1, 1949. As an 565
article there would be read abroad as well as at home he used more discreet language than, for instance, Revai had felt necessary in addressing the comrades in Budapest. In the main, however, his definitions and instructions followed the same pattern. There was to be "a sharpening of the class struggle in town and countryside," and he made plain, as Revai had done, that although "the main ally of the working class is the working peasantry" the working class always reserves to itself "the leading rôle." He also agreed that a civil war would not be necessary to bring in the full dictatorship of the proletariat. In Rumania as in Hungary the Soviet Army was always there "to support us." Vasile Luca, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist), followed soon afterwards with an article speaking of "the ever sharpening class struggle" and "acute class struggle in the countryside in par-